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I. JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL
1.

Whether the Water Availability Fee passed by the Board of Trustees of the

Washington County Water Conservancy District ("District") constituted an impact fee
under Utah Code Ann. §§ 11-36-101 ef seq. (the "Impact Fees Act").1 This issue raises
questions of law, in particular the interpretation of the Impact Fees Act. Legal
conclusions are reviewed for correctness, granting no particular deference to the trial
court's conclusions. ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah App.
1997). Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which is reviewed under a
correction of error standard, without deference to the trial court. State v. Bagshaw, 836
P.2d 1384,1385 (Utah App. 1992).
2.

Whether the trial court erred in considering facts which were not included

in the District's Verified Petition. Findings of fact are generally reviewed for clear error,
reversing only where the finding is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if this
Court otherwise reaches a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. 943 P.2d at 255.
However, when there is no competent evidence to warrant a finding of a material fact, the
question as to the proof to sustain the finding becomes one of law. Whittaker v. Ferguson,

x

The Impact Fees Act is attached as Addendum No. 1.

16 Utah 240, 242; 51 P. 980 (Utah 1898). The District objected to consideration of facts
outside of the Verified Petition at the hearing on this matter (R. 357, pp. 3-4, 35, 74) and
in its Response to Motion to Alter Judgment dated October 10, 2002. R. 284, p. 4, fn. 1.
III. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1442 (2000). Board may petition district court for judicial
determination of its acts - Procedure.
The board may, in its discretion, at any time file a petition in the court, praying a judicial
examination and determination of any power conferred hereby or by any amendment
hereto or of any tax or assessment levied or of any act, proceeding or contract of the
district, whether or not the contract shall have been executed, including proposed
contracts for the acquisition, construction, maintenance or operation of works for the
district. Such petition shall set forth the facts whereon the validity of such power,
assessment, act, proceeding or contract is founded and shall be verified by the chair of the
board. Notice of the filing of the petition shall be given by the clerk of the court, under
the seal thereof, stating in brief outline the contents of the petition and showing where a
full copy of any contract or contracts, therein mentioned, may be examined. The notice
shall be served by publication at least once a week for five consecutive weeks (five
issues) in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the principal office of
the district is located, and by posting the same in the office of the district at least 30 days
prior to the date fixed in the notice for the hearing on the petition. Any owner of property
in the district or person interested in the contract or proposed contract may appear and
demur to or answer the petition at any time prior to the date fixed for the hearing or
within such further time as may be allowed by the court; and the petition shall be taken as
confessed by all persons who fail so to appear. The petition and notice shall be sufficient
to give the court jurisdiction and, upon hearing, the court shall examine into and
determine all matters and things affecting the question submitted, shall make such
findings with reference thereto and render such judgment and decree thereon as the case
warrants. Costs may be divided or apportioned among the contesting parties in the
discretion of the trial court. Review of the judgment of the court may be had as in other
similar cases, except that such review must be applied for within 30 days after the time of
the rendition of such judgment, or within such additional time as may be allowed by the
court within 30 days. The Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern in matters of pleading
and practice where not otherwise specified herein. The court shall disregard any error,
irregularity or omission which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 11-36-101 et seq. (1953, as amended) is set forth in the addendum.
2

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition below

This dispute concerns a Water Availability Fee passed by the Board of Trustees of
the Washington County Water Conservancy District on July 17,2001. R. 1-30. The
District filed an Verified Petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1442 (hereinafter
"Section 1442") for a judgment declaring that the fee was not an impact fee under the
terms of the Impact Fees Act. Id.
The Verified Petition was executed under oath by the Chairman of the Board of
Trustees, Jack Lemmon. R. 5. The petition attached the "Final Rules and Regulations for
Secondary Retail Water Service for the La Verkin Creek Area (hereinafter the "Rules")
adopted July 17,2001, which set forth the terms and conditions upon which the Water
Availability Fee would be charged and other matters pertaining to the circumstances
under which an applicant might be allowed to connect to the District's secondary
(irrigation) water transmission system. R. 7-24.
Thereafter, Keystone Conversions, L.L.C ("Keystone") filed an answer. R. 38-49,
R. 128-139. Keystone also served a separate complaint upon the District, alleging that the
District had passed an impact fee, among other things.2 The District filed a motion to
dismiss that complaint, which has not been ruled on. R. 147-153.

2

The District has not been able to locate a copy of Keystone's complaint in the

record.
3

On October 18, 2001, a hearing was held on the District's petition. Pursuant to
stipulation, the trial court ordered that the hearing would be limited to the question of
whether or not the fee imposed by the Rules is an impact fee as defined by the Impact
Fees Act. R. 145-146. All other issues raised by Keystone were to be addressed later.
Id., See also R. 357, pp. 3-4.3 Furthermore, at the hearing, when the trial court inquired
as to the nature of the proceedings under Section 1442, the District asserted that the trial
court could decide the matter based only upon the Verified Petition and its attachments
and that, if during the course of the hearing, it appeared that further evidence was needed,
a continuance could be ordered. R. 357, pp. 12-13. Counsel for Keystone agreed that this
approach was "fair." Id. Also at that hearing, the court stated that it would not accept for
consideration a Trial Memorandum which had been submitted by Keystone the day before
the hearing. R 357, pp. 6-7. Keystone's Trial Memorandum included a number of
documents, none of which were supported by affidavits. R. 55-126. No witnesses were
called by either party at the hearing. R. 357.
After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court ruled that the District's
Water Availability Fee is an impact fee, based upon the assertion that the District's
approval of the construction of infrastructure within a development which would be
connected to the District's transmission system constituted the approval of a development

3

Portions of the transcript (R. 357) quoted in this brief are included in Addendum

No. 3.
4

activity as defined under the Impact Fees Act. R. 193-194. The trial court rejected an
alternative argument that, if the District approved of Keystone's application for secondary
water service, that approval would constitute authorization of a development activity
under the Impact Fees Act, assuming that approval is necessary to obtain authorization of
the subdivision from the City of Toquerville. R. 194.
Keystone filed a Motion to Alter Judgment, which was denied by the trial court in
a minute entry. R. 318. Keystone has appealed the trial court's rejection of Keystone's
second argument as well as the denial of its Motion to Alter Judgment. In addition,
Keystone claims it is entitled to attorneys fees under Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-401(5).
Brief at 25.
Both Keystone and the District filed notices of appeal in this matter on May 21,
2003. R. 410-412; R. 416-417.
B.

Statement of Facts

1.

The District is a political subdivision of the State of Utah duly organized

and existing under and by virtue of Utah Code Ann. §§ 17A-2-1401 et se#.(1953 as
amended) and is located in Washington County, Utah, which serves primarily as a
wholesaler of water to other agencies, working cooperatively with municipalities and
other water retailers. R. 1-2.

5

2.

On August 15, 2001, the District filed a Verified Petition in the Fifth

Judicial District Court in and for Washington County, Utah, Civil No. 010501616,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1442 requesting the trial court.
to determine and declare that the "Final Rules and
Regulations for Secondary Retail Water Service for the La
Verkin Creek Area" as amended on July 17,2001, do not
impose impact fees under Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-101 et seq.
and that the Rules are within the power of the District and
constitute a valid act pursuant to a valid proceeding of the
District.
R. 4. The Verified Petition included a copy of the Rules and a copy of a draft study
prepared by Alpha Engineering Company entitled "Availability, User & Standby Fee
Analysis55 (the "Draft Fee Analysis"). R. 1-30.4
3.

The following paragraphs are excerpted from the Rules:

a.
The District serves primarily as a wholesaler of water to other agencies,
working cooperatively with municipalities and other water retailers seeking to
meet mutually recognized goals. The District generally serves retail water only
when other local providers are not available or do not have the facilities to do so.
The District does not authorize development activities, whether by approval of
subdivision plats, issuance of building permits, or otherwise. The District does not
intend to impose any payment of money upon development activity as a condition
of development approval in connection with provision of water from the La Verkin
Creek Area. R. 7,1(1.
b.
Applicants desiring a connection for any property located within the
System's service area and within the legal boundaries of an incorporated
community shall first make application to that community for retail water service.
If the community is unable to provide retail water service to the applicant, the
applicant shall submit a letter to the District requesting that the District provide the

4

The Verified Petition, the Rules and Draft Fee Analysis which is attached hereto
as Addendum 2.
6

required retail water service, attaching a copy of a written statement from the
incorporated community expressing its inability or refusal to provide retail water
service. R. 7, ^ 2.
c.
All new construction or additions to the System must be inspected and
approved by the District during installation. The District will not accept any
additions to its System not inspected during installation. R. 11, ^| 10.
d.
An initial Water Availability Fee shall be due and payable for all lots within
a subdivision upon request by the developer for water service, in accordance with
the following fee schedule:
l
A acre lot -$1,381
Y2 acre lot -$2,761
1 acre lot - $5,522
2 acre lot- $11,044
Greater than 2 acre - $127 per 1,000 sq. ft.
R.24,1fl.
4

Keystone filed an "Answer" to the District's Verified Petition. R.38-49;

R. 128-139.5
5.

On October 3,2001, Keystone served on the District a complaint asking, in

part, that the trial court declare that the District had imposed an impact fee subject to the
Utah Impact Fees Act. (See footnote 2.) On September 18, 2001, the two cases were
consolidated. R. 35-36. On, October 30, 2001, the District moved to dismiss the
complaint. R. 147-153. To date no ruling has been issued on that motion.
6.

On October 18, 2001, the trial court executed a stipulated order which

stated:

5

The record shows that Keystone's answer was filed twice. The first one was datestamped by the clerk on September 21 and shows a certificate of mailing on that date.
The second one was date stamped by the clerk on October 18 and shows a certificate of
hand delivery on October 3.
7

.. .the hearing in this matter scheduled for October 18, 2001
shall, as between these parties, be limited to address only the
legal question of whether or not the fee imposed by the
Washington County Water Conservancy District as part of its
Rules adopted July 17, 2001, is or is not an impact fee,
leaving all other issues raised by Keystone, including but not
limited to whether the rules, as passed, are unreasonable or
are arbitrary, capricious and illegal, to be addressed at a later
date.
R. 146 (emphasis added).
7.

On October 18, 2001, a hearing was held on the District's Verified

Petition. Keystone did not present any affidavits and no witness testimony was taken at
the hearing. R. 357. Thus, the only sworn evidence was that presented in the District's
Verified Petition, (which included the Rules and the Draft Fee Analysis), verified by the
Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Jack Lemmon. R. 1-30.
8.

Keystone filed a Trial Memorandum on October 17,2001, the day before

the hearing on the District's Petition. R. 55-126. At the commencement of the hearing,
the trial court stated that it would not consider Keystone's Trial Memorandum for the
hearing on the District's Petition:
MR. REECE: .. .And so, as far as between us, we
would prefer to continue the matter until the court has time to
review the trial memorandum until the court has time to be
more prepared to go through and see what we have here. My
point simply is, this is too complicated for the court. It's an
issue that undoubtedly will be up on appeal. It's something
the court ought to spend some time reviewing. Having not
even read the petition for this morning, Your Honor, the
court, I think, would be (inaudible) to spend the extra time,
read through our common memorandum and (inaudible).
8

THE COURT: Mr. Reece, notice of this hearing was
given two months ago.
MR. REECE: That's correct.
THE COURT: And you filed an appearance more than
a month ago. Why is it that you are only filing your trial
memorandum fewer than 24 hours before the hearing?
MR. REECE: I'm ~ my schedule, Your Honor, and
I'm lucky I got it to the court (inaudible) even before the
hearing.
THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to consider it for
this hearing. It's unrealistic. And it doesnrt meet the
requirements of the rules. And if that results in what you
think is a poor decision and you end up going on appeal and
spending your client's money for appeal instead of getting
things into the court here on time, I guess that's one way to
approach it.
R 357, p. 6, line 23 - p. 7, line 23 (emphasis added).
9.

There was also a discussion with the trial court as to the procedural posture

of the case and the evidence before the trial court:
MS. HJELLE: what we have before you today is our
petition for a ruling on the initial case which was filed.... The
parties have reached a stipulation that the hearing today would
be limited to the issue of whether or not thefees which have
been imposed pursuant to a rule that is attached to our
petition.... Keystone has raised some additional issues both
in its answer to our petition and in its separate complaint
which was consolidated.... And we have stipulated that those
issues can be reserved for later, to be addressed later in the
proceedings. So right now before the court is solely the issue
of whether or not the fees that we have imposed meet the
statutory definition of what is an impact fee. Fair statement?
MR. REECE: Fair...
R 357, p 3, line 14 - p. 4, line 13 (emphasis added).
THE COURT: Okay. So you planned then to present
9

oral argument or any evidence also? Or is it really the
evidence not in dispute, it's a question of interpretation?
MS. HJELLE: I don't think the evidence is in
dispute.... If we got to that point, I suppose that could be
something that can be ruled on at the time. But my
anticipation will be that we would make our arguments and
the court would rule on what it could rule on today, and you
would make that decision. I mean, if it can't be done, it can't.
I still have hope of persuading you that these issues are not
that complex, that they are pretty straight forward, that you
can make that simple narrow question ruling on that simple
narrow question today, and that the rest of the issues raised —
counsel has the opportunity to bring those up to you in oral
argument. (Inaudible) convince you that they are significant
enough or add some complexity that I don't think is there,
then, perhaps, we may need to have a continuance. But I think
this could be ruled on today based on the material facts that
are before you in the petition and the exhibits.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let's go ahead with
your presentation then.
R. 357, p. 12, line 19 - p. 13, line 15 (emphasis added).
10.

After oral argument by counsel, the matter was submitted for decision and

the court took the matter under advisement. R. 357, p. 75. On, January 15, 2002, the trial
court ruled on the District's Verified Petition that "the availability fee imposed by the
District's Final Rules is an impact fee under the Impact Fees Act." R. 182-195. The
court based its determination on the assertion that:
... Keystone's construction of the secondary water system on
its own property creates additional demand and need for the
public facilities constituting the District's secondary water
system.... Even if the District had so much existing service
capacity that it could absorb new connections without
expanding its system, any construction of new subdivision
facilities which were to be connected to the District's system
10

would create additional demand on the District's system.
Without such excess capacity, any new connections would
create additional need for public facilities to be added to the
District's system. This would be true of any applicant's
construction of a secondary water system on its own property.
In this sense, the District's availability fee does constitute an
impact fee under the Impact Fees Act.
R. 193 - 194.
11.

The court rejected Keystone's alternative argument in support of a finding

that the Water Availability Fee is an impact fee, stating:
Keystone's alternative argument is that (i) Toquerville will
not approve Keystone's subdivision development activity
unless Keystone has a secondary water system, (ii) the District
has the only secondary water system from which Keystone
could obtain service, (iii) the District will not allow Keystone
to obtain service unless Keystone pays the availability fee,
and (iv) the statutory definition of impact fee as one imposed
as a condition of development approval does not require that
the fee be demanded by or paid to the body giving the
development approval. This argument does not appear to be
sound. If Keystone's development activity is the subdivision
generally, and if Keystone must apply to the District for
service because no other such service is available and that
service is a condition of Toquerville's approval of Keystone's
subdivision, the District's approval of Keystone's application
is a necessary predicate to Toquerville's approval of the
subdivision but it is not a "written.authorization... that
authorizes the commencement of development activity" and,
therefore, the District's approval is not "development
approval."
R194-195.
12.

On September 17, 2002, the court executed a Judgment on the Verified

Petition. R. 197-198. Both the Ruling and the Judgment made clear that the hearing was
11

held to address the fee imposed by the District's Rules pursuant to the Verified Petition.
The Judgment stated:
This matter came before this Court for hearing on October 18,
200lpursuant to a Petition filed August 15, 2001 by
Petitioner Board of Trustees of the Washington County Water
Conservancy District....
R. 197 (emphasis added).
The Ruling stated:
This matter came before the Court for hearing on October 18,
2001 pursuant to the Petition filed August 15, 2001 by
Petitioner Board of Trustees of Washington County Water
Conservancy District....
R. 182 (emphasis added).
The Judgment also stated:
Pursuant to a Stipulation between the parties the scope of the
hearing and of this judgment is "[T]o address only the legal
question of whether or not the fee imposed by the Washington
County Water Conservancy District as part of its Rules
adopted July 17, 2001, is or is not an impact fee."
R. 197 (emphasis added).
13.

On September 27, 2002, Keystone filed a Motion to Alter Judgment

pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 59(e) asking the trial court to reconsider its ruling insofar as it
had rejected Keystone's alternative arguments (as set forth in paragraph 12, above).
R. 199-280. In its Motion, Keystone raised two contradictory assertions. On the one
hand Keystone asserted that:

12

There is no question that //'Keystone obtains water from the
District, a payment of money (the Districts fee) will then be
imposed on Keystones development activity, nor is there a
question that Toquerville City has requiredpayment of that
fee as a condition of its granting its own development
approval.
R. 202.
On the other hand Keystone asserted that
this issue is of such great concern to Keystone... because the
District could simply amend its rules to eliminate the
language the court relied on in its finding that the fee is an
impact fee, and amend its contracts with local cities to
circumvent the Impact Fee Act.
R. 205 (emphasis added).
The District opposed that motion. R. 281-285. On December 10,2002, the trial
court denied Keystone's Motion to Alter Judgment in a minute entry, without explanation.
R.318.
14.

On January 23, 2003, Keystone filed a Motion and Memorandum for

Certification of Judgment under Rule 54(b). R. 332-336. The District opposed that
motion, in part, on the grounds that Keystone's complaint raised impact fee claims that
were unresolved R. 352-353. The trial court granted certification on April 22, 2003.
R. 394-397.
15.

While Keystone has not asserted in this case that it has asked the District for

water service from the La Verkin Creek Area, the District has asserted that Keystone has
never asked for such service:
13

MS. HJELLE: .. .Now, our regulation says before ...
we would go to all these other steps of charging them a fee
and agreeing to provide them water and so forth, [the] first
thing we need from them is something in writing saying
Toquerville will not provide them a service. We aren't there.
We don't have that. So ... we don't think that this regulation
at this point even applies to them. Now, they raise the issue
of standing.... We didn't dispute their standing to be here on
the ... narrow issue of looking at our regulation and looking
at the statute, is it an impact fee? But we would dispute...
their ability to come into this court today and start arguing all
of these extraneous facts about whether they can get water
from Toquerville or not when our regulation says before you
can even get water from us, we have to have something from
Toquerville saying they refuse to give you water. So, to us,
it's a black and white question. The issues that they are
entitled to raise before the court today are the issues ...
[given] these definitions, given the black and white statement
of our regulation, which we are entitled to have reviewed on
its face and on the district record. And that's what's in the file
the court has, not these extraneous documents in their Trial
Memorandum and this contract with C. F. H. that was
submitted today. These are just not relevant facts because they
haven't come to us with a letter from Toquerville saying ["]we
can't get water["].
R. 357, pp. 73-75.
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Keystone's appeal challenges a non-existent fee which it has created
hypothetically for this appeal. The particular hypothetical raised by Keystone on appeal
was not raised before or addressed by the trial court. As such, there is no justiciable
controversy which this Court can decide. Furthermore, none of the "facts" relied upon by
Keystone is supported by an evidentiary foundation.
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The trial court properly denied Keystone's Motion to Alter Judgment. Keystone's
arguments in its motion to alter judgment were based upon the hypothetical circumstance
that a municipality would collect a fee and then pay that fee to the District as a condition
of granting development approval. Besides being hypothetical, such a "pass through" fee
would not be an impact fee under the terms of the Impact Fees Act.
Keystone is not entitled to attorney's fees because none of its claims under the
Impact Fees Act have been heard to date in this case. Therefore, Keystone has not met
the requirements necessary to be awarded attorneys fees under that act.
The trial court erred in finding that the Water Availability Fee imposed by the
District's Rules is an impact fee. The trial court assumed facts which were not supported
by the record. Furthermore, the trial court misinterpreted the plain meaning of the Impact
Fees Act.
VI. ARGUMENT
A.

Keystone's Impact Fee Arguments must Be Rejected Because
They Do Not Raise a Justiciable Controversy and They Rely
upon Alleged Facts Not Admitted into Evidence
1.

Keystone's Arguments on Appeal Are Based upon
Hypothetical Scenarios

Keystone's first issue on appeal is whether "the fee collected by Toquerville
on behalf of the District is a fee collected as ca condition of development approval' within
the meaning of the Impact Fee Statute." Brief of Appellant (hereinafter "Brief) at 1.
Keystone argues that "A Water Availability Fee required by the District should be
15

considered an impact fee, regardless of what the District chooses to call the fee, where the
District has a town collect the fee on its behalf as part of the Town's conditions for final
plat approval." Brief at 10. This scenario has absolutely nothing to do with the Water
Availability Fee imposed by the District's Rules. R. 7-18. The Rules are clear that the
District does not have Toquerville collect the fee on its behalf as a part of Toquerville's
conditions for final plat approval.
The Water Availability Fee imposed by the Rules is charged by the District
directly to a party seeking to connect to the District's secondary water system and is
retained by the District. R. 24. The fee is not collected by any town or other entity.
R. 7-30. The fee is charged when the party requests water service. R. 24. No other fee
was submitted to the trial court for review. R. 1-30. Thus, the issue raised by Keystone is
completely hypothetical.
Keystone's own description of the trial court's ruling makes it clear that the entire
issue on appeal is hypothetical. Keystone asserts that "The Trial Court ruled that a pass
through fee from the District to Toquerville is not a fee connected to development and
that therefore, were the District to pass its fees through Toquerville onto developers, that
would not constitute an impact fee." Brief at 7 (emphasis added).
Moreover, Keystone's presentation does not accurately reflect the trial court's
ruling. The portion of the trial court's ruling that Keystone is appealing makes no
reference whatsoever to a "pass through" of District fees. The trial court stated:
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Keystone's alternative argument is that (i) Toquerville will
not approve Keystone's subdivision development activity
unless Keystone has a secondary water system, (ii) the District
has the only secondary water system from which Keystone
could obtain service, (iii) the District will not allow Keystone
to obtain service unless Keystone pays the availability fee,
and (iv) the statutory definition of impact fee as one imposed
as a condition of development approval does not require that
the fee be demanded by or paid to the body giving the
development approval. This argument does not appear to be
sound. If Keystone's development activity is the subdivision
generally, and if Keystone must apply to the District for
service because no other such service is available and that
service is a condition of Toquerville's approval of Keystone's
subdivision, the District's approval of Keystone's application
is a necessary predicate to Toquerville's approval of the
subdivision but it is not a "written authorization... that
authorizes the commencement of development activity" and,
therefore, the District's approval is not "development
approval."
R. 194-195 (emphasis added).
The trial court merely posited that, under this scenario, "the District will not allow
Keystone to obtain service unless Keystone pays the [District's] availability fee."

Id.

The trial court's ruling makes it clear that the court is focused on the Water Availability
Fee covered by the Rules, not some other "pass through" fee. So, Keystone is not
appealing the trial court's actual ruling, but a hypothetical ruling.
Keystone notes that its concerns arise because it believes the trial court's judgment
might allow the District to "implement its availability fee through the cities and towns"
and that "the District is likely to do that very thing." Brief at 4 (emphasis added). These
arguments, on their face, pertain to hypothetical situations which ask for an advisory
17

opinion from this Court.
2.

Keystone's Arguments on Appeal Are Based upon
Alleged Facts Which Were Not Admitted into
Evidence in this Case and Are Irrelevant to the
Issue to Be Decided,

The only evidence which can be considered in this case is contained in the
District's Verified Petition along with the attached exhibits. R. 1-30 Keystone did not
elect to file any affidavits or to put on any witness testimony at or before the hearing on
the District's Petition.6 Keystone's answer to the Verified Petition was not verified.
R. 38-49,128-139.
Keystone failed to meet its burden of production of evidence.
The proponent of a proposition has two burdens relative to his
proof to produce evidence which proves or tends to prove the
proposition asserted; and to persuade the trier of fact that his
evidence is more credible or entitled to the greater weight.
Once the proponent has produced such evidence, the burden
of producing evidence disproving or tending to disprove the

6

App. Rule 24(e) requires that "If reference is made to evidence the admissibility
of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the
evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected." The District is unable to
refer to any record because no evidence was received at the hearing. The trial court
rejected consideration of Keystone's Trial Memorandum. R. 357, p. 7, lines 17-19. While
Keystone submitted the affidavits of Alma Mansell, (R. 227-229), Greg Bell (R. 233-235)
and Blaine Walker (R. 288-290) after the hearing in connection with its Motion to Alter
Judgment (R. 199-280), and one separately filed affidavit (Cal Lowe, R. 300-304), those
affidavits were not timely and cannot be considered for other reasons set forth below.
Because those affidavits were clearly not proper, the District objected. R. 305-307. If
Keystone had taken the proper steps necessary to create an evidentiary record beyond that
presented by the Verified Petition, the District would have introduced evidence to show
that Keystone's allegations are largely unfounded.
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proposition shifts to the opponent, and he must introduce such
evidence as may be necessary to avoid the risk of a directed
verdict or a peremptory finding against him as to the existence
of the proposition.
Koesling v. Basamakis. 539 P.2d 1043,1046 (Utah 1975).
Having elected not to present evidence at or before the hearing, Keystone has no
basis for appeal:
plaintiff, at the time of trial, chose not to present any evidence
to substantiate his claim ... [the trial court] made findings,
conclusion [sic] of law and judgment accordingly. In the
absence of any such evidence, plaintiff clearly failed in his
burden of proof and the ruling should not be disturbed on
appeal.
Larsen v. Associates Fin. Serv. Co., 564 P.2d 1128, 1130 (Utah 1977) (citing Koesling v.
Basamakis).
As this Court has stated, "foundation is crucial." Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P.2d
162, 165 (Utah 1981). Without foundation, it is impossible to tell the real function,
significance or relevancy of any purported document. Where evidence would properly be
excluded for lack of foundation, it surely should not be considered after a hearing when
there was no reason for counsel for the District to anticipate that the trial court would be
relying upon it in rendering a decision.
a.

The Facts Keystone Relies upon in this Appeal Are Not in the
Record and Not Part of the Trial Court's Ruling.

Since the only issue properly before the trial court pertained to whether the Water
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Availability Fee imposed by the Rules is an impact fee, the only relevant facts are those
which address that fee, as set forth in the Verified Petition and the attached exhibits, not
other fees which may or may not be imposed in the future.
Thus, for example, when Keystone asserts that the District "claims that it is not
bound by the Impact Fee Act when a subdivision developer pays money to Toquerville
for the District's water because the District itself does not grant subdivision approval,"
not only is Keystone making an allegation which cannot be supported by the record, the
issue it is creating is irrelevant to the case at bar. Brief at 11. Simply put, Keystone has
set up a straw man for this Court to consider.
Furthermore, Keystone's assertions about the arrangements between the District
and Toquerville are based upon selected documents which were not subjected to
evidentiary review.7 Going one step farther into creative argument, Keystone asserts that
neither Toquerville nor the District has prepared an impact analysis for the fee
Toquerville charges as part of its impact fee, without any evidentiary reference
whatsoever. Brief at 23.

7

Had Keystone pursued its complaint in this matter and had the allegations of that
complaint come up for evidentiary hearing, the District could have shown that no
developer has ever been asked to pay money to Toquerville to receive water directly from
the District through its secondary water system. Keystone makes a number of factual
assertions and arguments pertaining to "the Toquerville Ordinance" and the Toquerville
Secondary Water System ("TSWS") that cannot be addressed in this case. They raise
complex issues that would have required appropriate evidentiary consideration. Although
it is tempting to show that a number these assertions are not true, they are simply not
properly considered here.
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It is difficult to address factual allegations where no evidentiary record was
developed to support them. But in order to ensure that these allegations do not go
unchallenged, the District addresses them briefly below.
i.

Unsupported Allegations Contained in Trial
Memorandum

All citations to the record at pages 55-126 refer to Keystone's Trial Memorandum
which was submitted to the trial court the day before the hearing and which the trial court
stated it would not consider. R. 357, p. 7, lines 17-18. None of these allegations can be
considered in this case. None of them is supported by sworn testimony. The District,
objected to the Trial Memorandum (R. 357, p. 5, lines 17-19) and, relying on the trial
court's statement that the Trial Memorandum would not be considered, did not attempt to
rebut the allegations of the Trial Memorandum. At this juncture, the District's only
recourse is to say that, had it had the opportunity to do so, it could have proven most of
these allegations untrue or irrelevant to this case.
Reference to impact fee analyses allegedly performed by other entities (Ash Creek
Sewer District and Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, R. 55-126 Brief at 14-15)
in other situations, in addition to having no evidentiary basis, have no relevance to the
District's Water Availability Fee imposed under the Rules.
ii.

Improper Affidavits

Keystone's reliance on the affidavits of Alma Mansell (R. 227-229), Greg Bell
(R. 233-235) and Blaine Walker (R. 288-290) to show legislative intent is similarly
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unfounded.8 Not only were these affidavits presented after the hearing on the petition, in
Keystone's Motion to Alter Judgment submitted pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 59(e), they
are not admissible for the purpose they are proffered.
These affidavits purport to explain the intent of the legislature in passing the
Impact Fees Act. However, assuming there were doubt about the legislature's intent in
passing a statute, the notions of individuals involved in the process are not legitimate
sources of interpretations of legislative intent.
"When examining a statute, we lookfirstto its plain language
as the best indicator of the legislature's intent and purpose in
passing the statute.11 Wilson v. Valley Mental Health. 969
P.2d 416,418 (Utah 1998). Legislators may decide that a
statute should be passedfor myriad, often even different,
reasons, but where the legislative purpose is expressly stated
and agreed to as part of the legislation, we do not look to the
views expressed by one or more legislators in floor debates,
committee minutes, or elsewhere, in determining the intent of
the statute.
Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Or,. 2002 UT 134, \ 19, 67 P.3d 436 (emphasis added).
Even where the views expressed by individual legislators might be considered,
they must be from the legislative history itself, such as floor debates or committee
minutes, not fsompost hoc affidavits.

8

ManselFs affidavit states that he is a state senator. Walker, who claims to be
"associated with the Utah Association of Realtors," and Bell, who says he is a former
mayor, both state that they were members of an "Impact Fees Act Drafting Committee,"
without explaining who convened this committee or on what basis they would have
personal knowledge of legislative intent.
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When interpreting an ambiguous statute, we first try to
discover the underlying intent of the legislature, guided by the
meaning and purpose of the statute as a whole and the
legislative history.
Hansen v. Salt Lake County. 794 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah 1990).
Likewise, the affidavit of Calvin D. Lowe (R. 300-304)9 submitted separately by
Keystone, in addition to being submitted too late, pertains to the collection of fees by
Toquerville for culinary water pursuant to an agreement between Toquerville and the
District which is not in evidence. Thus, this affidavit is irrelevant to this case.
b.

Because the District's claims are based solely on the Rules,
Keystone's allegations are irrelevant to this case.

The District's claim is that the Water Availability Fee it charges and collects, as set
forth in the Rules, to make its water available to parties who ask to connect directly to the
District's secondary water transmission system, is not an impact fee. R. 7-18. The only
facts properly considered are whether the Water Availability Fee imposed by the Rules
falls under the purview of the Impact Fee Act. Because the allegations raised by
Keystone do not address the Water Availability Fee charged under the Rules, they are
irrelevant to this case.

9

The District objected to the filing of the Lowe affidavit. R. 305-307.
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Keystone's appeal is based upon the trial court's rejection of its alternative
argument. Insofar as Keystone's alternative argument is concerned, the trial court's
decision is based upon presumed facts which are not in the record. As stated by the court,
Keystone's argument was:
(i) [the Town of] Toquerville will not approve Keystone's
subdivision development activity unless Keystone has a
secondary water system, (ii) the District has the only
secondary water system from which Keystone could obtain
service, (iii) the District will not allow Keystone to obtain
service unless Keystone pays the availability fee, and (iv) the
statutory definition of impact fee as one imposed as a
condition of development approval does not require that the
fee be demanded by or paid to the body giving the
development approval.
R. 194.
Points (i) and (ii) quoted above have no foundation in the record. No evidence
was admitted regarding Toquerville's ordinances or policies regarding subdivision
approval.10 No evidence was admitted regarding what sources might be available from
which Keystone might obtain secondary water service.11
10

A purported Toquerville ordinance is found as an attachment to Keystone's
Motion to Alter Judgement at R. 258-280. No evidentiary foundation was laid to show,
for example, whether this is a currently-valid ordinance.
n

The District asserts that, had these matters been considered in an evidentiary
hearing, the facts would have shown that while Toquerville requires that a development
have the infrastructure (pipes, valves, etc.) for a secondary water system in place in order
to be approved, Toquerville does not require water to be available to place into the system
as a precondition to development approval. The facts would also have shown that
Toquerville regularly grants subdivision approval without any secondary water
commitment to the subdivision. There is no evidentiary basis for the trial court's
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No deference is due to these findings by the trial court because there was no
witness whose credibility was tested by the trial court and thus no advantaged "position to
observe testimony first hand." 943 P.2d at 255.
3.

Keystone's Hypothetical Scenarios Do Not Give
Rise to a Justiciable Controversy,

Keystone's issues about hypothetical actions the District might take in the future
are not justiciable.
The courts are not a forum for hearing academic contentions
or rendering advisory opinions. To maintain an action for
declaratory relief, plaintiff must show that the justiciable and
jurisdictional elements requisite in ordinary actions are
present, for a judgment can be rendered only in a real
controversy between adverse parties.
Bairdv. State. 574 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1978).12
This case is similar to that presented in Boyle v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 866
P.2d 595 (Utah App. 1993), where the parties were disputing whether insurance policies
were valid and enforceable before there was any determination of liability on behalf of
the insured parties. The court said:

assertion that "the District's approval of an application for secondary water service does
affect the municipality's subdivision approval...." R. 194. It is simply untrue that
Toquerville's approval of Keystone's development is conditioned on payment of the
District fee imposed by the Rules.
12

It is clear from the language of Section 1442 that the case at bar is essentially one
for declaratory judgment.
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Where there exists no more than a difference of opinion
regarding the hypothetical application of [an insurance
provision] to a situation in which the parties might, at some
future time, find themselves, the question is unripe for
adjudication.
866 P.2d at 598 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Another analogous case is Salt Lake County v. Bangerter, 928 P.2d 384 (Utah
1996), where:
[Certain] Counties maintain that the [Equalization] Act
violates article XIII, section 3 of the Utah Constitution, which
requires that property be assessed at its fair market value.
They claim standing to bring this action because reduction in
the assessed value of property under the Equalization Act
would diminish tax revenues and impact county budgets. The
Counties, however, have failed to set forth the specific facts
of any case that has arisen. As far as we can determine from
the record before us, no taxpayer has actually received a
reduction of his property taxes under the statute.
928 P.2d at 385 (footnote omitted). Similarly, Keystone has not asked for water from the
District, and has not paid a "pass through fee," for direct connection to the District's
secondary water transmission system in the La Verkin Creek area. To render this case
ripe for adjudication the Rules should have provided that a town would collect the
District's fee. Furthermore, Keystone should have already been asked to pay such a fee
based upon a request for a water connection. Otherwise, there is no "accrued state of
facts as opposed to a hypothetical state of facts." Id. at 385.
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In this case, where the issue raised on appeal is a hypothetical situation based upon
fears that the District, at some future time, might ask Toquerville to collect a fee on
behalf of the District for connections directly to the District's secondary water
transmission line, the question is not ripe for adjudication.
B.

The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Keystone's Motion to
Alter Judgment

The trial court was required to rely on the facts contained in the Verified Petition
in the absence of sworn rebuttal evidence.
1.

The Applicable Procedure Required That the
Allegations of the Verified Petition Be Rebutted
Through Sworn Testimony,

The procedural basis for the hearing was Section 1442, which provides:
Any owner of property in the district or person interested in
the contract or proposed contract may appear and demur to or
answer the petition at any time prior to the date fixed for the
hearing or within such further time as may be allowed by the
court; and the petition shall be taken as confessed by all
persons who fail so to appear.
The rules of civil procedure apply to the proceedings taken on the District's
Verified Petition:
The petition and notice shall be sufficient to give the court
jurisdiction and, upon hearing, the court shall examine into
and determine all matters and things affecting the question
submitted, shall make such findings with reference thereto
and render such judgment and decree thereon as the case
warrants.... The Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern in
matters of pleading and practice where not otherwise
specified herein.
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Utah Code. Ann. § 17A-2-1442 (emphasis added).
Nothing in this language eliminates application of the Rules of Civil Procedure to
the hearing of the questions submitted by the petition. These rules require that the Utah
Rules of Evidence govern the admission of evidence. Utah R. Civ. P. 43 ("All evidence
shall be admitted which is admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence...").
Furthermore, evidence must be presented through witnesses, orally in open court, or
through affidavits or depositions. Id. Documents must be authenticated or identified as
a condition precedent to admissibility. Utah R. Ev. 901.
Once Keystone had answered the petition, its duty was to present evidence in
accordance with the rules, through sworn testimony.

Having failed to do so, it cannot

now ask this Court to rely upon the confusing mixture of unsubstantiated "scenarios"
which Keystone has selected to emphasize in its appeal. Furthermore, the trial court was
entitled to rely only on the facts set forth in the Verified Petition, including its exhibits, in
rendering its ruling.
2.

The Procedure Was Clarified at the Start of the
Hearing on the District's Verified Petition.

The issues before the trial court, including the limitation to the evidence presented
by the Verified Petition, were clarified at the commencement of the hearing by counsel
for the District and agreed to by counsel for Keystone:
MS. HJELLE: what we have before you today is our petition
for a ruling on the initial case which was filed.... The parties
have reached a stipulation that the hearing today would be
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limited to the issue of whether or not the fees which have
been imposed pursuant to a rule that is attached to our
petition.... Keystone has raised some additional issues both
in its answer to our petition and in its separate complaint
which was consolidated.... And we have stipulated that those
issues can be reserved for later, to be addressed later in the
proceedings. So right now before the court is solely the issue
of whether or not the fees that we have imposed meet the
statutory definition of what is an impact fee. Fair statement?
MR.REECE:Fair...
R. 357,p 3, line 14-p. 4, line 13.
The trial court raised questions as to the nature of the proceedings and counsel for
the District articulated the limited focus on the Verified Petition and its exhibits, upon
which basis the trial court agreed to proceed, without objection from counsel for
Keystone:
MS. HJELLE: I don't think the evidence is in dispute.... If
we got to that point, I suppose that could be something that
can be ruled on at the time. But my anticipation will be that
we would make our arguments and the court would rule on
what it could rule on today, and you would make that
decision. I mean, if it can't be done, it can't. I still have hope
of persuading you that these issues are not that complex, that
they are pretty straight forward, that you can make that simple
narrow question ruling on that simple narrow question today,
and that the rest of the issues raised — counsel has the
opportunity to bring those up to you in oral argument.
(Inaudible) convince you that they are significant enough or
add some complexity that I don't think is there, then, perhaps,
we may need to have a continuance. But I think this could be
ruled on today based on the material facts that are before you
in the petition and the exhibits.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let's go ahead with your
presentation then.
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R. 357, p. 12, line 22 - p. 13, line 15.
Thus, when Keystone asserts to this Court that "the District did not ask then to
limit the scenarios in which such a finding could be had" (Brief at 24) that assertion is
directly contradicted by the record.
The importance of confining the trial court's decisions to those based upon the
Verified Petition is clarified by Keystone's argument in favor of allowing "probable
scenarios" to support a ruling in this matter. Brief at 24-25. Keystone's probable
scenario is cobbled together from assertions that the District "does in fact collect its fees
from municipalities" and that the "fees charged by the Rules are indeed impact fees even
though they are collected by Toquerville," assertions which are clearly contradicted by the
plain language of the Rules and are also contradicted by Keystone's own argument that
"this Court must assume that the pass through theory is possible." Brief at 24-25
(emphasis added). Is the "pass through" fee happening or is it just possible? Both
arguments are made in the same paragraph of the Brief and they can't both be true.
3.

The Hypothetical Fee Raised by Keystone Would
Not Be an Impact Fee

As set forth in detail in Section D.4. below, it is clear that the impact fee is charged
by the entity that imposes the condition of development approval.13 Logically, the only
entity that can impose conditions on development approval is the one who grants the

13

An exception applies to school districts which are specifically provided for in
the Impact Fees Act.
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approval. Thus, for example, under Keystone's hypothetical scenario, if, as a condition of
development approval, Toquerville requires payment of a fee that it would ultimately
"pass through" to the District, Toquerville, not the District, would be required to analyze
that cost in its impact fee analysis.
The District's supplies wholesale water to municipalities. As such, its
involvement in development activities is similar to those of any other supplier of products
to a municipality that delivers the final service. The District's role, in those cases where a
fee it charges to a city is passed through to a developer as part of that city's impact fee, is
similar to the other components of the city's capital facilities plan. The District's charges
for water supplies which become part of the city's service structure is a cost of doing
business the city must pay, whether to contractors, suppliers or others. But, the District's
fee itself is not imposed as a condition of development approval and is not an impact
fee.14
C.

Keystone is not entitled to attorneys' fees under the Impact Fees
Act

Keystone asserts it right to attorneys' fees based upon Utah Code Ann.
§ 11-36-401(5) which states:

14

Keystone's arguments regarding the collection of impact fees on behalf of school
districts are not persuasive in this case. If the legislature saw fit to expressly authorize the
pass through of those fees, it suggests that pass through fees not expressly required to be
studied under the Impact Fees Act do not fall under its purview.
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The judge may award reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to
the prevailing party in any action brought under this section.
(Emphasis added.)
The matter on appeal was brought by the District pursuant to Section 1442. It was
not brought under Utah Code Ann. §11-3 6-401. The judgment made clear that the matter
was decided pursuant to the District's petition.
No proceedings have been held pursuant to Keystone's complaint. Keystone's
only basis for suit might been under Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-401(1), which states:
Any person or entity residing in or owning property within a
service area, and any organization, association, or corporation
representing the interests of persons or entities owning
property within a service area, may file a declaratory
judgment action challenging the validity of the fee.15
Keystone's complaint, which purports to raise issues under the Impact Fees Act,
has never been perfected or heard, because the District's motion to dismiss that complaint
has never been ruled on. Keystone's assertion that it was "successful" in bringing a
complaint against the District is simply not supported by the pleadings in this matter.
Interestingly, Keystone's complaint asserts that it is brought under Utah Code
Ann. § 17A-2-1428(4). Nowhere does the complaint cite to 11-36-401(1) or (4) as the
basis for Keystone's standing to sue. There is simply no basis for an award of attorney's
fees under Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-401.

15

The remaining sections of § 11-36-401 require a party to have paid an impact fee,
which Keystone has not done.
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D.

The Trial Court Erred in Finding That the District's Final Rules
Imposed an Impact Fee,
1.

The Ruling is based on facts not in evidence.

The lack of an evidentiary basis outside of the District's Verified Petition
presents a challenge in marshaling facts in support of the trial court's ruling. The
following statements of fact found in the trial court's ruling are supported by the Verified
Petition:
The District has constructed, and it owns and manages, a
secondary water system which presently supplies secondary
irrigation water to residents of the Town of Toquerville and is
capable of providing wholesale irrigation water to areas of the
towns of La Verkin and Toquerville known as the La Verkin
Creek Area. The system constructed by the District includes
such facilities as a creek diversion, a pump station, pipelines
and fittings, and a metering and control station. The District
primarily provides water to municipalities as a wholesaler of
water, and only provides service to individuals on a retail basis
when other sources are unavailable. The District does not
require or encourage individual property owners to obtain their
water service from the District. In particular, the District's
water system was not constructed specifically for Keystone.
R. 186-187; See, R. 2, f 5, R. 28, f 3; R. 2,14.
The Final Rules require that an owner of property within one
of the communities in the La Verkin Creek Area who wants to
obtain water service from the District "shall first make
application to that community for retail water service." The
owner may apply to the District for service only if the owner's
"community," i.e., the municipality in which the owners
property is located, is "unable to provide retail water service to
the applicant and the owner gives the District specific written
proof thereof." The owner must then sign and submit to the
District a "Water Application and Agreement." If that is
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approved by the District, the owner is responsible to construct
and pay for all of the facilities necessary to get water from the
Districts system to the owners property and all such
construction must meet the District's standards. After
construction and acceptance by the District, all such facilities
become the property of the District. Approval of the ownerfs
application also subjects the owner to all the provisions of the
Final Rules, of course, including payment of fees.
R. 188; R. 7, f 2; R. 8, line 2; R. 8,If 3.
Of the three fees imposed pursuant to the District's Final
Rules, the only fee challenged by Keystone is the "initial water
availability fee" (hereafter the "availability fee"). Paragraph 18
of the Final Rules provides, in part, that "[r]ates, charges, and
fees shall be reasonably related, to the extent possible, to the
cost of providing the service for which they are assessed."
Exhibit A to the Final Rules specifies that the availability fee
"shall be due and payable for all lots within a subdivision upon
request by the developer for water service," and includes the
current fee schedule in which availability fees are imposed on
the basis of the size of the lot. The per-acre amount of the
availability fee was calculated by dividing the number of acres
in the District's potential service area into the total cost of the
system already constructed by the District.
R. 189; R. 18, ^ 18; R. 24,13; R. 28, ^ 4.
Although the parties have argued their positions primarily with
respect to new development of property, the Final Rules do not
limit applications to property developers. The District has
attempted to distance itself from development approval
matters; paragraph 1 of the Final Rules provides: "The District
does not authorize development activities, whether by approval
of subdivision plats, issuance of building permits, or
otherwise. The District does not intend to impose any payment
of money upon development activity as a condition of
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development approval in connection with provision of water
from the La Verkin Creek Area."
R. 189; R . 7 , 1 1 .
After the hearing, the trial court informally conferred with the parties and, based
upon that discussion, concluded:
... the following facts appear to be uncontested: Keystone is
required to have a secondary water system in place in order to
obtain subdivision development approval from Toquerville
Town. Keystone is not required to have a connection to the
District's system, and would not even be allowed to apply for
service from the District unless it first applied to Toquerville
and/or to TSWS and was unable to obtain service there. The
District's approval of Keystone's application for service would
not ensure that Keystone's development would be approved by
Toquerville.
R. 190-191. The District,did not object to this statement of fact.
The following statements of fact in the trial court's ruling were taken from
Keystone's Trial Memorandum, which the trial court stated it would not consider. None
of the facts set forth below were admitted into evidence based upon foundation which
might have placed them in context and established their relevancy, if any:
Prior to adoption of the Final Rules on July 17, 2001, the
District had published notice of a public hearing on a proposed
new impact fee to be imposed on new developments to which
the District would provide water service. The District's draft
"Development Impact Fee Analysis" dated May 2001 proposed
calculating the impact fee on the basis of the cost of the
District's system and the size of the area which could be
served through the system. That Analysis also recommended
that "A Development Impact Fee .. should be assessed to all
developments where service has been committed before the
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final plat is recorded.55 The District's proposed Resolution
would have imposed impact fees of the sort contemplated in
the Impact Fees Act, Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-101 et seq. As
contemplated in the Impact Fees Act, the District had also
prepared a draft Capital Facilities Plan, which concluded that,
since the Districts resources were already committed to
existing obligations, "if a situation should arise which requires
the District to provide water directly in connection with any
development activity, any new projects or alterations to
existing projects to provide retail water must be paid for
through impact fees.55
R. 187; R.72.
Keystone objected to the District's impact fee proposal both
before and at a public hearing on June 12, 2001. The District
then postponed any decision on its plans until its July 17,2001
meeting. At that meeting, however, the District produced the
Availability, User & Standby Fee Analysis and the Final Rules,
changing the recommendation from an "impact fee55 to three
different fees. After discussion and public comment; including
objections by Keystone, the District's board adopted the Final
Rules. In doing so, the District did not comply, and did not
intend to comply, with the Impact Fees Act.
R. 188.
The trial court apparently assumed that Keystone's Trial Memorandum contained a
complete set of documents from which valid factual conclusions could be drawn, without
ever requiring a foundation to be laid in support of this assumption. The Trial
Memorandum included only selected documents from the District's prior actions. It did
not, for example, clarify the relationship of the Rules to prior versions which may have
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been prepared along with other draft documents attached to the Trial Memorandum. There
is simply no reliable foundation from which to conclude that the description of the
District's prior activities is an accurate, cohesive representation of those actions.
Assuming some of the points made by the trial court which were drawn from
Keystone's Trial Memorandum could be established as fact, the entire discussion is
irrelevant to the issue of whether the fee actually passed by the District under the Rules is
an impact fee. In its analysis of the parties' arguments, the trial court asserted the
following points of fact, for which there is no basis in the record:
Even if the District had so much existing service capacity that
it could absorb new connections without expanding its system,
any construction of new subdivision facilities which were to be
connected to the District's system would create additional
demand on the District's system. Without such excess capacity,
any new connections would create additional need for public
facilities to be added to the District's system. This would be
true of any applicant's construction of a secondary water
system on its own property.
R. 193. The District had no opportunity to object to this factual conclusion prior to the
appeal of this matter.
.. .[C]ontrary to the District's argument, the District's approval
of an application for secondary water service does affect the
municipality's subdivision development approval....
R. 194. The District objected to this factual conclusion. R. 284, fn. 1.
These factual conclusions, drawn in the course of deciding that the District's Water
Availability Fee is an impact fee, are not supported by the materials presented to the trial
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court, including the inadmissible Trial Memorandum materials and affidavits submitted
after the hearing. It is clear from the trial court's findings drawn from the Verified Peition
that the District is not in the business of providing retail service and would only allow
connection to its transmission infrastructure under limited circumstances that are unlikely
to arise often. The Rules require that any party, such as Keystone, which is located within
the boundaries of a municipality, must first seek service from the city and be refused,
before even approaching the District for service. R. 7, ^f 2. Even then, the applicant must
meet a number of stringent requirements before service will be provided. R. 7-24.
Nothing in Keystone's unfounded allegations suggest that there might be even one
connection to the District's system, much less enough applicants to impact that system.
None of the documents which Keystone included with its Trial Memorandum gives
contextual facts to show how much total resource the District has and how likely it would
be that the District's existing capacity might be impacted by individual applicants to
connect to the La Verkin Creek system. Indeed, given the District's role as a wholesale
provider throughout the county, it is more logical to assume that an individual
development would have virtually no impact on the District's capacity and that, over time,
the District's other activities as a wholesaler would always leave a little excess available
for individual cases in need of small amounts of water from the District's system.
Given the record before the trial court, there was simply no basis to conclude that
"any new connections would create additional need for public facilities to be added to the
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District's system." R. 193.
2.

No deference is due to the trial court's presumptions
which were not based upon facts supported by an
evidentiary foundation.

The appellate court has a duty to determine whether there is any legitimate proof in
support of the trial court's findings.
This, however, is a question of fact in a case at law, and
therefore we have no power to consider the justness of the
findings. The only province of this court in such a case is to
ascertain whether there is any legitimate proof 'which supports
them, and, if there is, then we are conclusively bound by them,
regardless of whether or not the findings are supported by a
preponderance of the testimony, or whether, in our judgment,
on all the evidence, they are justified. It is only when there is
no competent evidence in a law case to warrant a finding of
fact which materially affects the rights of a litigant that this
court will interfere, and hold the finding nugatory and void. In
such event, the question as to the proof to sustain the finding
becomes one of law, and falls within the jurisdiction of the
appellate court.
Whittaker v. Ferguson. 16 Utah 240, 242; 51 P. 980 (Utah 1898) (emphasis added).
In addressing the trial court's role under Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a), this Court has said:
It must give great weight to the findings made and the
inferences drawn by the trial judge, but it must reject his
findings if it considers them to be clearly erroneous. Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2585 (1971)
(citations omitted.)... A finding is "clearly erroneous" when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on
the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed. Further clarification is
offered by Wright & Miller: The appellate court
does not
consider and weigh the evidence de novo. The mere fact that
on the same evidence the appellate court might have reached a
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different result does not justify it in setting the findings aside.
It may regard a finding as clearly erroneous only if the finding
is without adequate evidentiary support or induced by an
erroneous view of the law. Thus, the content of Rule 52(a)fs
"clearly erroneous" standard, imported from the federal rule,
requires that if the findings... are against the clear weight of
the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, the
findings... will be set aside.
State v.Walker, 743 P.2d 191,192-193 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added, internal paragraph
separations and indentations indicating quotations omitted).
In the absence of proof that certain [facts applied], how can the
court say that such was the case, and render judgment therefor?
Declaring such to be the fact in a finding does not make it so.
The proof must show the existence of the fact, or the finding
will be nugatory, and the judgment which it is to support
subject to attack and avoidance.... The burden was upon the
defendants to show that what work was performed improved
the property, and conferred a benefit upon the owners. The
court had no power to infer that such was the case, without
proof.
Bacon v.Thornton, 16 Utah 138, 142, 51 P. 153, 153-154 (Utah 1897).
3.

The law governing the District's activities does not
support the Ruling

The trial court asserted that, if Keystone were authorized to connect to the District's
secondary water transmission system in accordance with the Rules, a "need" would be
created for the District to add more facilities to its system. This assertion is contrary to the
District's governing legislation.
Nothing in the District's authorizing legislation requires the District to provide any
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particular water service to any particular entity or area. See, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 17A-2-1401 etseq. Thus, if the capacity of any particular part of the District's system
were to be completely allocated, the District could choose not to add to its system to
replace that capacity. Furthermore, since the District's primary focus is on wholesale
water supply, the allocation of a portion of a given pipeline capacity may not have any
material effect on the District's overall system. Certainly, as noted above, there was no
evidence in this case on that point. Without such evidence, there is simply no basis to
conclude that allocation of capacity in the La Verkin Creek Area transmission line would
have any particular impact on the District's operations and infrastructure. In short, while,
the District can choose to allocate capacity in its system, such an allocation does not
require that additional capacity be created to replace the capacity so allocated.
4.

The Ruling extends the purview of the Impact Fees
Act beyond its clear intention

The Impact Fees Act provides a series of interlinked definitions which determine
when a fee is considered an "impact fee." These include the following:
"Impact fee" means a payment of money imposed upon
development activity as a condition of development approval.
Utah Code Ann. § ll-36-102(7)(a) (emphasis added).
"Development approval" means any written authorization from
a local political subdivision that authorizes the commencement
of development activity.
Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-102(4) (emphasis added).
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"Development activity" means any construction or expansion
of a building, structure, or use, any change in use of a building
or structure, or any changes in the use of land that creates
additional demand and need for public facilities.
Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-102(3) (emphasis added).
Thus, to constitute an impact fee, a fee must be charged as a condition of
authorization of commencement of the defined development activities, when they create
demand and need for public facilities. The trial court focused on the presumed "need" for
District facilities: "Without such excess capacity, any new connections would create
additional need for public facilities to be added to the District's system." R. 193.
(emphasis in original). The statute uses the term "need" conjunctively with the term
"demand." The term "demand" connotes a requirement. See, e.g., Black's Law
Dictionary 429 (Sixth Ed. 1990).
The focus must be on the authorization that creates the requirement for public
facilities. If the District were to approve the secondary irrigation facilities that Keystone
builds within its subdivision in order to connect those facilities to the District's
transmission system, that connection merely serves the demand that was created by the
authorization to build the subdivision in thefirstplace and that authorization does not
come from the District. The District's voluntary offer of service to a developer such as
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Keystone, assuming the developer can meet the requirements of the Rules, merely serves
to diminish demand for public facilities to be provided by the entity which authorizes the
development.16
The Impact Fees Act is clear that the entity imposing the impact fee is the same
entity that prepares a capital facilities plan identifying the proposed means by which that
same entity will meet the demands placed upon existing public facilities by new
development activity which that entity authorizes:
Before imposing impact fees, each local political subdivision
shall prepare a capital facilities plan.
(b) The plan shall identify:
(i) demands placed upon existing public facilities by new
development activity; and
(ii) the proposed means by which the local political
subdivision will meet those demands.
Utah Code Ann. § ll-36-201(2)(a) (emphasis added). The District is simply unable to
comply with this planning requirement because where its only role is to make its facilities
available on a voluntary basis. The District has no way to know what demands might be
created by the actions of cities and counties which authorize development activities or how
much of that activity, if any, will come to the District for service or, of those, how many
will actually qualify for service.

16

This is particularly true where there is no evidence that any municipality requires
secondary water service (as opposed to culinary water service) as a condition of
development approval.
43

Even where the District actually provides water by contract to a municipality, there
is no basis to require the District to analyze the impacts of that city's development
authorizations on that city's system. Similarly, there is no requirement for the District to
analyze impacts on the District's system of development approvals granted by City where
the District has agreed to provide water in accordance with specified contractual terms.17
Where a fee is charged by a city that has the power of development approval, even where
some portion of the fee is later paid by the city to the District for some portion of its water
supply, that does not obligate the District to do an impact fee study. The city does the
impact fee analysis because it is the city which imposes the fee as a condition of
development. The city is the only entity that is capable of evaluating the demands placed
on its facilities by its approval of development and how the city will meet those demands,
whether through development of its own water supplies or by seeking further supplies
from the District.
If a city owes a fee to the District and that fee is recovered from fees the city
charges to a developer as a condition of development, the District's fee is not converted to
an impact fee, because the fee paid to the District by the city is not paid as a condition of
development approval. That fee would be paid to the District by the City at a separate,

17

The District does not dispute that there might be circumstances where the Impact
Fees Act might apply to its activities. For example, where the District is the only source
for water in a subdivision and the developer is required by a city to obtain service directly
from the District as a condition of the city granting subdivision approval, the District may
have to comply with the Impact Fee Act in connection with fees the District collects.
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independent time and place, not causally connected to the City's development approval
process.
VII. CONCLUSION
The trial court's ruling that the Water Availability Fee imposed by the Rules is an
impact fee should be reversed. Keystone's claims concerning alleged fees which might
someday be charged by the Town of Toquerville on behalf of the District should be
dismissed as unripe. In the alternative, these claims should be remanded to the trial court
for consideration in the course of proceedings on Keystone's complaint. Keystone's
claims for legal fees should be denied.
DATED this 2^)^

day of November, 20p3C^
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UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 36-11-101 ETSEQ.
11-36-101. Title.
This chapter is known as the "Impact Fees Act.'1
11-36-102. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Building permit fee" means the fees charged to enforce the uniform codes
adopted pursuant to Title 58, Chapter 56, Utah Uniform Building Standards Act, that are
not greater than the fees indicated in the appendix to the Uniform Building Code.
(2) "Capital facilities plan" means the plan required by Section 11-36-201.
(3) "Development activity" means any construction or expansion of a building,
structure, or use, any change in use of a building or structure, or any changes in the use of
land that creates additional demand and need for public facilities.
(4) "Development approval" means any written authorization from a local political
subdivision that authorizes the commencement of development activity.
(5) "Enactment" means:
(a) a municipal ordinance, for municipalities;
(b) a county ordinance, for counties; and
(c) a governing board resolution, for special districts.
(6) "Hookup fees" means reasonable fees, not in excess of the approximate
average costs to the political subdivision, for services provided for and directly
attributable to the connection to utility services, including gas, water, sewer, power, or
other municipal, county, or independent special district utility services.
(7) (a) "Impact fee" means a payment of money imposed upon development
activity as a condition of development approval.
(b) "Impact fee" does not mean a tax, a special assessment, a building permit fee,
a hookup fee, a fee for project improvements, or other reasonable permit or application
fee.
(8) (a) "Local political subdivision" means a county, a municipality, or a special
district created under Title 17A, Special Districts.
(b) "Local political subdivision" does not mean school districts, whose impact fee
activity is governed by Section 53A-20-100.5.
(9) "Private entity" means an entity with private ownership that provides culinary
water that is required to be used as a condition of development.
(10) (a) "Project improvements" means site improvements and facilities that are:
(i) planned and designed to provide service for development resulting from a
development activity; and
(ii) necessary for the use and convenience of the occupants or users of
development resulting from a development activity.
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(b) "Project improvements" does not mean system improvements.
(11) "Proportionate share" means the cost of public facility improvements that are
roughly proportionate and reasonably related to the service demands and needs of any
development activity.
(12) "Public facilities" means only the following capital facilities that have a life
expectancy often or more years and are owned or operated by or on behalf of a local
political subdivision or private entity:
(a) water rights and water supply, treatment, and distribution facilities;
(b) wastewater collection and treatment facilities;
(c) storm water, drainage, and flood control facilities;
(d) municipal power facilities;
(e) roadway facilities;
(f) parks, recreation facilities, open space, and trails; and
(g) public safety facilities.
(13) (a) "Public safety facility" means a building constructed or leased to house
police, fire, or other public safety entities.
(b) "Public safety facility" does not mean a jail, prison, or other place of
involuntary incarceration.
(14) (a) "Roadway facilities" means streets or roads that have been designated on
an officially adopted subdivision plat, roadway plan, or general plan of a political
subdivision, together with all necessary appurtenances.
(b) "Roadway facilities" includes associated improvements to federal or state
roadways only when the associated improvements:
(i) are necessitated by the new development; and
(ii) are not funded by the state or federal government.
(c) "Roadway facilities" does not mean federal or state roadways.
(15) (a) "Service area" means a geographic area designated by a local political
subdivision on the basis of sound planning or engineering principles in which a defined
set of public facilities provide service within the area.
(b) "Service area" may include the entire local political subdivision.
(16) (a) "System improvements" means:
(i) existing public facilities that are designed to provide services to service areas
within the community at large; and
(ii) future public facilities identified in a capital facilities plan that are intended to
provide services to service areas within the community at large.
(b) "System improvements" does not mean project improvements.
11-36-201. Impact fees — Analysis — Capital facilities plan — Notice of plan —
Summary — Exemptions.
(1) (a) Each local political subdivision and private entity shall comply with the
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requirements of this chapter before establishing or modifying any impact fee.
(b) A local political subdivision may not:
(i) establish any new impact fees that are not authorized by this chapter; or
(ii) impose or charge any other fees as a condition of development approval
unless those fees are a reasonable charge for the service provided.
(c) Notwithstanding any other requirements of this chapter, each local political
subdivision shall ensure that each existing impact fee that is charged for any public
facility not authorized by Subsection 11-36-102(12) is repealed by July 1, 1995.
(d) (i) Existing impact fees for public facilities authorized in Subsection
11-36-102(12) that are charged by local political subdivisions need not comply with the
requirements of this chapter until July 1, 1997.
(ii) By July 1, 1997, each local political subdivision shall:
(A) review any impact fees in existence as of the effective date of this act, and
prepare and approve the analysis required by this section for each of those impact fees;
and
(B) ensure that the impact fees comply with the requirements of this chapter.
(2) (a) Before imposing impact fees, each local political subdivision shall prepare
a capital facilities plan.
(b) The plan shall identify:
(i) demands placed upon existing public facilities by new development activity;
and
(ii) the proposed means by which the local political subdivision will meet those
demands.
(c) Municipalities and counties need not prepare a separate capital facilities plan if
the general plan required by Sections 10-9-301 and 17-27-301 contains the elements
required by Subsection (2)(b).
(d) (i) If a local political subdivision prepares an independent capital facilities
plan rather than including a capital facilities element in the general plan, the local
political subdivision shall, before adopting the capital facilities plan:
(A) give public notice of the plan according to this Subsection (2)(d);
(B) at least 14 days before the date of the public hearing:
(I) make a copy of the plan, together with a summary designed to be understood
by a lay person, available to the public; and
(II) place a copy of the plan and summary in each public library within the local
political subdivision; and
(C) hold a public hearing to hear public comment on the plan.
(ii) Municipalities shall comply with the notice and hearing requirements of, and,
except as provided in Subsection 11-3 6-40 l(4)(f), receive the protections of, Subsections
10-9-103(2) and 10-9-402(2).
(iii) Counties shall comply with the notice and hearing requirements of, and,
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except as provided in Subsection ll-36-401(4)(f), receive the protections of, Subsections
17-27-103(2) and 17-27-402(2).
(iv) Special districts and private entities shall comply with the notice and hearing
requirements of, and receive the protections of, Section 17A-1-203.
(v) Nothing contained in Subsection (2)(d) or in the subsections referenced in
Subsections (2)(d)(ii) and (iii) may be construed to require involvement by a planning
commission in the capital facilities planning process.
(e) (i) Local political subdivisions with a population or serving a population of
less than 5000 as of the last federal census need not comply with the capital facilities plan
requirements of this part, but shall ensure that the impact fees imposed by them are based
upon a reasonable plan.
(ii) Subsection (2)(e)(i) does not apply to private entities.
(3) In preparing the plan, each local political subdivision shall generally consider
all revenue sources, including impact fees, to finance the impacts on system
improvements.
(4) A local political subdivision may only impose impact fees on development
activities when its plan for financing system improvements establishes that impact fees
are necessary to achieve an equitable allocation to the costs borne in the past and to be
borne in the future, in comparison to the benefits already received and yet to be received.
(5) (a) Each local political subdivision imposing impact fees shall prepare a
written analysis of each impact fee that:
(i) identifies the impact on system improvements required by the development
activity;
(ii) demonstrates how those impacts on system improvements are reasonably
related to the development activity;
(iii) estimates the proportionate share of the costs of impacts on system
improvements that are reasonably related to the new development activity; and
(iv) based upon those factors and the requirements of this chapter, identifies how
the impact fee was calculated.
(b) In analyzing whether or not the proportionate share of the costs of public
facilities are reasonably related to the new development activity, the local political
subdivision shall identify, if applicable:
(i) the cost of existing public facilities;
(ii) the manner of financing existing public facilities, such as user charges, special
assessments, bonded indebtedness, general taxes, or federal grants;
(iii) the relative extent to which the newly developed properties and the other
properties in the municipality have already contributed to the cost of existing public
facilities, by such means as user charges, special assessments, or payment from the
proceeds of general taxes;
(iv) the relative extent to which the newly developed properties and the other
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properties in the municipality will contribute to the cost of existing public facilities in the
future;
(v) the extent to which the newly developed properties are entitled to a credit
because the municipality is requiring their developers or owners, by contractual
arrangement or otherwise, to provide common facilities, inside or outside the proposed
development, that have been provided by the municipality and financed through general
taxation or other means, apart from user charges, in other parts of the municipality;
(vi) extraordinary costs, if any, in servicing the newly developed properties; and
(vii) the time-price differential inherent in fair comparisons of amounts paid at
different times.
(c) Each local political subdivision that prepares a written analysis under this
Subsection (5) on or after July 1, 2000 shall also prepare a summary of the written
analysis, designed to be understood by a lay person.
(6) Each local political subdivision that adopts an impact fee enactment under
Section 11-36-202 on or after July 1, 2000 shall, at least 14 days before adopting the
enactment, submit to each public library within the local political subdivision:
(a) a copy of the written analysis required by Subsection (5)(a); and
(b) a copy of the summary required by Subsection (5)(c).
(7) Nothing in this chapter may be construed to repeal or otherwise eliminate any
impact fee in effect on the effective date of this act that is pledged as a source of revenues
to pay bonded indebtedness that was incurred before the effective date of this act.
11-36-202. Impact fees — Enactment -- Required provisions.
(1) (a) Each local political subdivision wishing to impose impact fees shall pass an
impact fee enactment.
(b) The impact fee imposed by that enactment may not exceed the highest fee
justified by the impact fee analysis performed pursuant to Section 11-36-201.
(c) In calculating the impact fee, each local political subdivision may include:
(i) the construction contract price;
(ii) the cost of acquiring land, improvements, materials, and fixtures;
(iii) the cost for planning, surveying, and engineering fees for services provided
for and directly related to the construction of the system improvements; and
(iv) debt service charges, if the political subdivision might use impact fees as a
revenue stream to pay the principal and interest on bonds, notes, or other obligations
issued to finance the costs of the system improvements.
(d) In enacting an impact fee enactment:
(i) municipalities shall:
(A) make a copy of the impact fee enactment available to the public at least 14
days before the date of the public hearing; and
(B) comply with the notice and hearing requirements of, and, except as provided
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in Subsection ll-36-401(4)(f), receive the protections of, Subsections 10-9-103(2) and
10-9-802(2);
(ii) counties shall:
(A) make a copy of the impact fee enactment available to the public at least 14
days before the date of the public hearing; and
(B) comply with the notice and hearing requirements of, and, except as provided
in Subsection ll-36-401(4)(f), receive the protections of, Subsections 17-27-103(2) and
17-27-802(2); and
(iii) special districts shall:
(A) make a copy of the impact fee enactment available to the public at least 14
days before the date of the public hearing; and
(B) comply with the notice and hearing requirements of, and receive the
protections of, Section 17A-1-203.
(e) Nothing contained in Subsection (l)(d) or in the subsections referenced in
Subsections (l)(d)(i)(B) and (ii)(B) may be construed to require involvement by a
planning commission in the impact fee enactment process.
(2) The local political subdivision shall ensure that the impact fee enactment
contains:
(a) a provision establishing one or more service areas within which it shall
calculate and impose impact fees for various land use categories;
(b) either:
(i) a schedule of impact fees for each type of development activity that specifies
the amount of the impact fee to be imposed for each type of system improvement; or
(ii) the formula that the local political subdivision will use to calculate each
impact fee;
(c) a provision authorizing the local political subdivision to adjust the standard
impact fee at the time the fee is charged to:
(i) respond to unusual circumstances in specific cases; and
(ii) ensure that the impact fees are imposed fairly; and
(d) a provision governing calculation of the amount of the impact fee to be
imposed on a particular development that permits adjustment of the amount of the fee
based upon studies and data submitted by the developer.
(3) The local political subdivision may include a provision in the impact fee
enactment that:
(a) exempts low income housing and other development activities with broad
public purposes from impact fees and establishes one or more sources of funds other than
impact fees to pay for that development activity;
(b) imposes an impact fee for public facility costs previously incurred by a local
political subdivision to the extent that new growth and development will be served by the
previously constructed improvement; and
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(c) allows a credit against impact fees for any dedication of land for, improvement
to, or new construction of, any system improvements provided by the developer if the
facilities:
(i) are identified in the capital facilities plan; and
(ii) are required by the local political subdivision as a condition of approving the
development activity.
(4) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), the local political subdivision may
not impose an impact fee to cure deficiencies in public facilities serving existing
development.
(5) Notwithstanding the requirements and prohibitions of this chapter, a local
political subdivision may impose and assess an impact fee for environmental mitigation
when:
(a) the local political subdivision has formally agreed to fund a Habitat
Conservation Plan to resolve conflicts with the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16
U.S.C. Sec 1531, et seq. or other state or federal environmental law or regulation;
(b) the impact fee bears a reasonable relationship to the environmental mitigation
required by the Habitat Conservation Plan; and
(c) the legislative body of the local political subdivision adopts an ordinance or
resolution:
(i) declaring that an impact fee is required to finance the Habitat Conservation
Plan;
(ii) establishing periodic sunset dates for the impact fee; and
(iii) requiring the legislative body to:
(A) review the impact fee on those sunset dates;
(B) determine whether or not the impact fee is still required to finance the Habitat
Conservation Plan; and
(C) affirmatively reauthorize the impact fee if the legislative body finds that the
impact fee must remain in effect.
(6) Each political subdivision shall ensure that any existing impact fee for
environmental mitigation meets the requirements of Subsection (5) by July 1, 1995.
(7) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, municipalities imposing
impact fees to fund fire trucks as of the effective date of this act may impose impact fees
for fire trucks until July 1, 1997.
(8) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a local political
subdivision may impose and collect impact fees on behalf of a school district if
authorized by Section 53A-20-100.5.
11-36-301. Impact fees - Accounting.
Each local political subdivision collecting impact fees shall:
(1) establish separate interest bearing ledger accounts for each type of public
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facility for which an impact fee is collected;
(2) deposit impact fee receipts in the appropriate ledger account;
(3) retain the interest earned on each fund or account in the fund or account; and
(4) at the end of each fiscal year, prepare a report on each fund or account
showing:
(a) the source and amount of all monies collected, earned, and received by the
fund or account; and
(b) each expenditure from the fund or account.
11-36-302. Impact fees -- Expenditure.
(1) A local political subdivision may expend impact fees only for:
(a) system improvements for public facilities identified in the capital facilities
plan; and
(b) system improvements for the specific public facility type for which the fee was
collected.
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), a local political subdivision shall
expend or encumber the impact fees for a permissible use within six years of their receipt.
(b) A local political subdivision may hold the fees for longer than six years if it
identifies, in writing:
(i) an extraordinary and compelling reason why the fees should be held longer
than six years; and
(ii) an absolute date by which the fees will be expended.
11-36-303. Refunds.
A local political subdivision shall refund any impact fees paid by a developer, plus
interest earned, when:
(1) the developer does not proceed with the development activity and has filed a
written request for a refund;
(2) the fees have not been spent or encumbered; and
(3) no impact has resulted.
11-36-401. Impact fees — Challenges — Appeals.
(1) Any person or entity residing in or owning property within a service area, and
any organization, association, or corporation representing the interests of persons or
entities owning property within a service area, may file a declaratory judgment action
challenging the validity of the fee.
(2) (a) Any person or entity required to pay an impact fee who believes the fee
does not meet the requirements of law may file a written request for information with the
local political subdivision who established the fee.
(b) Within two weeks of the receipt of the request for information, the local
political subdivision shall provide the person or entity with the written analysis required
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by Section 11-36-201, the capital facilities plan, and with any other relevant information
relating to the impact fee.
(3) (a) Any local political subdivision may establish, by ordinance, an
administrative appeals procedure to consider and decide challenges to impact fees.
(b) If the local political subdivision establishes an administrative appeals
procedure, the local political subdivision shall ensure that the procedure includes a
requirement that the local political subdivision make its decision no later than 30 days
after the date the challenge to the impact fee is filed.
(4) (a) In addition to the method of challenging an impact fee under Subsection
(1), a person or entity that has paid an impact fee that was imposed by a local political
subdivision may challenge:
(i) if the impact fee enactment was adopted on or after July 1,2000:
(A) whether the local political subdivision complied with the notice requirements
of this chapter with respect to the imposition of the impact fee; and
(B) whether the local political subdivision complied with other procedural
requirements of this chapter for imposing the impact fee; and
(ii) except as limited by Subsection (4)(a)(i), the impact fee.
(b) A challenge under Subsection (4)(a) may not be initiated unless it is initiated
within:
(i) for a challenge under Subsection (4)(a)(i)(A), 30 days after the person or entity
pays the impact fee;
(ii) for a challenge under Subsection (4)(a)(i)(&), 180 days after the person or
entity pays the impact fee; or
(iii) for a challenge under Subsection (4)(a)(ii), one year after the person or entity
pays the impact fee.
(c) A challenge under Subsection (4)(a) is initiated by filing:
(i) if the local political subdivision has established an administrative appeals
procedure under Subsection (3), the necessary document, under the administrative appeals
procedure, for initiating the administrative appeal;
(ii) a request for arbitration as provided in Subsection 11-36-402(1); or
(iii) an action in district court.
(d) (i) The sole remedy for a challenge under Subsection (4)(a)(i)(A) is the
equitable remedy of requiring the local political subdivision to correct the defective notice
and repeat the process.
(ii) The sole remedy for a challenge under Subsection (4)(a)(i)(B) is the equitable
remedy of requiring the local political subdivision to Correct the defective process.
(iii) The sole remedy for a challenge under Subsection (4)(a)(ii) is a refund of the
differen.ce between what the person or entity paid as a n impact fee and the amount the
impact fee should have been if it had been correctly calculated.
(e) Nothing in this Subsection (4) may be construed as requiring a person or entity
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to exhaust administrative remedies with the local political subdivision before filing an
action in district court under this Subsection (4).
(f) The protections given to a municipality under Subsection 10-9-103(2) and to a
county under Subsection 17-27-103(2) do not apply in a challenge under Subsection
(4)(a)(i)(A).
(5) The judge may award reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to the prevailing
party in any action brought under this section.
(6) Nothing in this chapter may be construed as restricting or limiting any rights to
challenge impact fees that were paid before the effective date of this chapter.
11-36-402. Challenging an impact fee by arbitration ~ Procedure — Appeal
— Costs.
(1) Each person or entity intending to challenge an impact fee under Subsection
11-3 6-40 l(4)(c)(ii) shall file a written request for arbitration with the local political
subdivision within the time limitation provided in Subsection 11-3 6-40 l(4)(b) for the
applicable type of challenge.
(2) If a person or entity files a written request for arbitration under Subsection (1),
an arbitrator or arbitration panel shall be selected as follows:
(a) the local political subdivision and the person or entity filing the request may
agree on a single arbitrator within ten days after the day the request for arbitration is filed;
or
(b) if a single arbitrator is not agreed to in accordance with Subsection (2)(a), an
arbitration panel shall be created with the following members:
(i) each party shall select an arbitrator within 20 days after the date the request is
filed; and
(ii) the arbitrators selected under Subsection (2)(b)(i) shall select a third arbitrator.
(3) The arbitration panel shall hold a hearing on the challenge within 30 days after
the date:
(a) the single arbitrator is agreed on under Subsection (2)(a); or
(b) the two arbitrators are selected under Subsection (2)(b)(i).
(4) The arbitrator or arbitration panel shall issue a decision in writing within ten
days from the date the hearing under Subsection (3) is completed.
(5) Except as provided in this section, each arbitration shall be governed by Title
78, Chapter 31 a, Utah Arbitration Act.
(6) The parties may agree to:
(a) binding arbitration;
(b) formal, nonbinding arbitration; or
(c) informal, nonbinding arbitration.
(7) If the parties agree in writing to binding arbitration:
(a) the arbitration shall be binding;
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(b) the decision of the arbitration panel shall be final;
(c) neither party may appeal the decision of the arbitration panel; and
(d) notwithstanding Subsection (10), the person or entity challenging the impact
fee may not also challenge the impact fee under Subsection 11-36-401(1), (4)(c)(i), or
(4)(c)(iii).
(8) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (8)(b), if the parties agree to formal,
nonbinding arbitration, the arbitration shall be governed by the provisions of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act.
(b) For purposes of applying Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures
Act, to a formal, nonbinding arbitration under this section, notwithstanding Section
63-46b-20, "agency" means a local political subdivision.
(9) (a) An appeal from a decision in an informal, nonbinding arbitration may be
filed with the district court in which the local political subdivision is located.
(b) Each appeal under Subsection (9)(a) shall be filed within 30 days after the date
the arbitration panel issues a decision under Subsection (4).
(c) The district court shall consider de novo each appeal filed under this
Subsection (9).
(d) Notwithstanding Subsection (10), a person or entity that files an appeal under
this Subsection (9) may not also challenge the impact fee under Subsection 11-36-401(1),
(4)(c)(i), or (4)(c)(iii).
(10) (a) Except as provided in Subsections (7)(d) and (9)(d), this section may not
be construed to prohibit a person or entity from challenging an impact fee as provided in
Subsection 11-36-401(1), (4)(c)(i), or (4)(c)(iii).
(b) The filing of a written request for arbitration within the required time in
accordance with Subsection (1) tolls all time limitations under Section 11-36-401 until the
date the arbitration panel issues a decision.
(11) The person or entity filing a request for arbitration and the local political
subdivision shall equally share all costs of an arbitration proceeding under this section.
11-36-501. Private entity assessment of impact fees — Notice and hearing —
Audit.
(1) A private entity may only impose a charge for public facilities as a condition
of development approval by imposing an impact fee. A private entity shall comply with
the requirements of this chapter before imposing an impact fee.
(2) Except as otherwise specified in this chapter, a private entity is subject to the
same requirements of this chapter as a local political subdivision.
(3) Where notice and hearing requirements are specified, a private entity shall
comply with the notice and hearing requirements for special districts.
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(4) A private entity that assesses an impact fee under this chapter is subject to the
audit requirements of Title 51, Chapter 2, Audits of Political Subdivisions, Interlocal
Organizations, and Other Local Entities.
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Tab 2

Barbara G. Hjelle (Bar No. 4597)
Attorney for Petitioner
136 North 100 East
St. George, Utah 84770
(435) 673-3617

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF
WASHINGTON COUNTY WATER
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT,

PETITION

civil NO. oio5oib(y

Petitioner
c

hu((lCiC BL&cMfrr^

Petitioner, BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF WASHINGTON COUNTY WATER
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, above named, for cause of action alleges as follows:
JURISDICTION
1.

Jurisdiction over this action is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3-4 and

17A-2-1442.
VENUE
2.

Venue for this action is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-7 because

Washington County is the county in which the cause of action arises.
PARTIES
3.

The Washington County Water Conservancy District ("District") is now and at all

times relevant hereto has been a political subdivision of the State of Utah duly organized and

COPY

existing under and by virtue of Utah Code Ann. §§ 17A-2-1401 etseq. and is located in
Washington County, Utah.
4.

The District serves primarily as a wholesaler of water to other agencies, working

cooperatively with municipalities and other water retailers seeking to meet mutually recognized
goals. The District generally serves retail water only when other local providers are not available
or do not have the facilities to do so.
5.

The District owns and manages a secondary water system (the "System") which

presently supplies secondary irrigation water to residents of the Town of Toquerville pursuant to
an Agreement for Joint and Cooperative Action by and between the District, the Town of
Toquerville and the Toquerville Irrigation Company dated December 28, 1998. The System is
capable of providing wholesale irrigation water within the towns of La Verkin and Toquerville
(the "La Verkin Creek Area").
6.

On July 17, 2001, at a duly noticed public meeting of the Board of Trustees and

pursuant to the authority granted by Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1435(l), the District approved
amended "Final Rules and Regulations for Secondary Retail Water Service for the La Verkin
Creek Area" (the "Rules"), a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein as
Exhibit A. Among other things, the Rules provide as follows:
The District serves primarily as a wholesaler of water to other
agencies, working cooperatively with municipalities and other water
retailers seeking to meet mutually recognized goals. The District
generally serves retail water only when other local providers are not
2

available or do not have the facilities to do so. The District does
not authorize development activities, whether by approval of
subdivision plats, issuance of building permits, or otherwise. The
District does not intend to impose any payment of money upon
development activity as a condition of development approval in
connection with provision of water from the La Verkin Creek Area.
7.

The Rules also provide that the District will only offer a connection for any

property located within the legal boundaries of an incorporated community if the municipality is
unable or unwilling to provide retail water service. See Exhibit A, paragraph 2.
8.

Based upon a study prepared by Alpha Engineering Company, the Rules

established a fee schedule for connection to the System, which is set forth on Exhibit B, attached
hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. The fees are required to be paid upon request by
a party who desires to obtain water from the System and as a result of connection to and receipt
of water from the system. In no event are they required to be paid at the time of any request for
approval of a development activity from any governmental authority.
9.

The District does not authorize development activities in the La Verkin Creek

Area whether by approval of subdivision plats, issuance of building permits, or otherwise.
10.

Utah Code Ann. § 1 l-36-102(7)(a) states:
"Impact fee" means a payment of money imposed upon
development activity as a condition of development approval.

11.

The fees set by the District to obtain a connection to and service through the

System are not a condition of development approval.
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12.

The fees charged by the District under the Rules are not impact fees under Utah

Code Ann. § 11-36-101 etseq.
CLAIM FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests the court to determine and declare that the
"Final Rules and Regulations for Secondary Retail Water Service for the La Verkin Creek Area"
as amended on July 17? 2001, do not impose impact fees under Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-101 et
seq. and that the Rules are within the power of the District and constitute a valid act pursuant to a
valid proceeding of the District.
DATED this _ / S

day of

BARBARA G^HJELLE
AttornevjefPetitioner
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STATE OF UTAH
ss.

COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

)

Jack Lemmon, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says that he is the
chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Washington County Water Conservancy District, that he
has read and understands the content of the foregoing petition, that the statements therein
contained are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief, and that he executed the
same.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / < ^ day of August, 2001.

NOTAR

ANN CARROLL JENSEN
fffW/WK'SMefUm

Petitioner's Address:
136 North 100 East
St. George, UT 84770

572 WEST MARIPOSA DR.
WASHINGTON, UT 84780
COMM. EXP. 7-9-2005
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EXHIBIT A

FINAL RULES AND REGULATIONS
for
SECONDARY RETAIL WATER SERVICE
for the
LA VERKIN CREEK AREA
Amended July 17, 2001
Rules and regulations covering the Washington County Water Conservancy District
(hereafter "District") retail water delivery from the Toquerville - La Verkin Creek pipeline
(hereafter the "System"). The following rules and regulations will be in effect immediately upon
approval:
1.

The District serves primarily as a wholesaler of water to other agencies, working

cooperatively with municipalities and other water retailers seeking to meet mutually recognized
goals. The District generally serves retail water only when other local providers are not available
or do not have the facilities to do so. The District does not authorize development activities,
whether by approval of subdivision plats, issuance of building permits, or otherwise. The
District does not intend to impose any payment of money upon development activity as a
condition of development approval in connection with provision of water from the La Verkin
Creek Area.
2.

Applicants desiring a connection for any property located within the Svstem's service

area and within the legal boundaries of an incorporated community shall first make application to
that community for retail water service. If the community is unable to provide retail water
service to the applicant, the applicant shall submit a letter to the District requesting that the
District provide the required retail water service, attaching a copy of a written statement from the
incorporated community expressing its inability or refusal to provide retail water service. The
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applicant shall bear the cost of all expenses associated with providing the retail water service and
shall sign a Water Application and Agreement as set forth below. If the developer of a
subdivision has complied with the requirements of this paragraph and is in compliance with other
requirements of these rules and regulations, subsequent purchasers of lots within that subdivision
shall be deemed to have complied with this paragraph.
3.

Any lot or property owner who signs a Water Application and Agreement with the

District shall be responsible to construct and install at his sole expense and without any cost or
other obligation to the District, any pipelines, delivery lines, hydrants, appurtenant fixtures,
additional storage or pump capacity, water meters or measurement devices and other facilities
involved in obtaining and distributing water made available from District facilities to the place of
use provided for in the Water Application and Agreement pursuant to a design approved by the
District. All such facilities shall be the property of the District.
4.

All Applicants shall sign a Water Application and Agreement, which shall include the

location of the desired water service, the name of the applicant, the date of application, and the
basic terms and conditions with which the applicant shall be required to comply to receive water
service. Such terms and conditions shall require the applicant to:
a.

Pay fees as established by District's Board of Trustees.

b.

Pay for all sums of water usage and service charges at the rates set by the

District's Board of Trustees.
c.

Abide by and obey all rules and regulations then in effect and thereafter adopted

by the District.
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d.

Pay all water and service charges within 30 days of the statement due date.

Failure to pay said charges within 30 days will result in the account being declared
delinquent and the water service terminated upon proper notice. Water service shall be
restored upon payment of all delinquent amounts, including any penalties and late fees, as
well as a reasonable service restoration charge.
e.

Pay any interest, collection charge, and restoration fee set forth in these Rules and

Regulations or the Water Application and Agreement.
f.

Pay all costs, including attorneys' fees, incurred by the District through its efforts

to collect any delinquency or to enforce these rules and regulations.
g.

Provide an individual guarantee if the Applicant is a corporation not listed on a

national stock exchange.
h.

Acknowledge that the service connection and all of its parts and materials from

the water main to the point of connection to the line stubbed from the building, said point
of connection being immediately downstream of the meter box, shall be the property of
the District.
i.

Acknowledge that the District has the right to inspect a customer's plumbing for

possible cross-connections or other hazards to the Svstem.
j.

Acknowledge that the District reserves the right at any time, without notice, to

shut off or curtail water service, in the event of a water scarcity, or to facilitate repairing
or maintenance of the System.
k.

Identify a relative by name and address, not living with the applicant.
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5.

The developer of any subdivision shall be deemed an applicant for each lot within the

subdivision and shall apply for and sign a Water Application and Agreement for each lot and pay
the appropriate fees prior to construction of any intended additions to the System within the
subdivision.
6.

All main water lines or extensions to the System shall use high density polyethelene pipe

having inside diameter of not less than an 8" ductile iron size and consistent with AWWA
specifications for fittings for high density polyethelene pipe.
7.

All extensions to the System will require a full evaluation of present pump and storage

capacity taking into account any committed lots in the subdivision. The evaluation must show
the System has adequate pump and storage capacity to meet the proposed or expected water
service connections. Pump and storage requirements will be the greater of that recommended or
required by the State Department of Environmental Quality, Washington County, Division of
Drinking Water or the State Fire Marshall.
8.

All additions or extensions to the System shall be designed and certified by a Utah

licensed civil engineer and approved in writing by the District's engineers. Review by the
District engineers shall be paid for by the developer.
9.

All new subdivisions or extensions to the System will be required to install main lines

and laterals of high density polyethelene pipe along with a meter base which will meet or exceed
the specifications set forth by the District prior to installation. All meters shall be, at a minimum,
one inch (1") mag meters. Each new subdivision shall install a regulatory reservoir large enough
to provide a minimum of 10 acre feet of storage plus such additional storage as may be necessary
to provide 100 % of the required or anticipated flow for any 12-hour period at a minimum of 40
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pounds per square inch of pressure to each lot within the subdivision. Each regulatory reservoir
shall be equipped with a master meter of applicable line size at the reservoir inlet.
10.

All new construction or additions to the System must be inspected and approved by the

District during installation. The District will not accept any additions to its System not inspected
during installation. The developer shall submit "as built" plans to the District after construction,
before any connection to the existing System.
11.

The District will not provide water to a lot which is less than the size recommended by

the Hansen, Allen & Luce Groundwater Protection Study. Thus, if the study recommended a
density of not less than 10 acres per home, the District would not provide water to any
subdivision with a home density of less than one home per 10 acres unless it is serviced by a
sewer system such as the Ashcreek Special Service District system. (Copies of the Hansen, Allen
& Luce Study can be reviewed at the District offices).
12.

For subdivision lots with septic systems platted and approved by the Washington County

Planning Commission and by state and local health agencies prior to the time of the issuance of
the Hansen, Allen & Luce report, the District will honor whatever densities have been approved.
Subdivision plans approved after December 31, 1998, which does not meet those density
requirements, will not receive water from the District
13.

Transfer of an Existing Connection to a New Applicant:
a.

An existing connection may be transferred to a new applicant upon the same

terms and conditions as required for a new connection with the exception that in place of
a connection fee, the new applicant must demonstrate proof of purchase or lease. If no
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connection has yet been made to the System, the new applicant shall be responsible for
standby fees and connection and service fees thereafter, as set forth in Exhibit A.
b.

If the new applicant is a renter or lessee, the property owner must also sign a

Water Application and Agreement. The property owner must return the Water
Application and Agreement within five (5) days after the renter or lessee has signed an
agreement, if a local resident. Out of town property owners must return the Water
Application and Agreement within ten (10) days. If the property owner does not return
the Water Application and Agreement within the specified number of days, water service
shall be terminated at the service address until the signed Water Application and
Agreement is received. The bill shall be mailed to the property owner, who shall see that
the bill is paid either personally or by the renter or lessee. The renter or lessee shall remit
a refundable deposit, the amount of which shall be established from time to time by the
District Manager.
c.

Applicants for a connection to provide water at a location within the System on a

temporary basis (for purposes such as construction) shall sign a Temporary Water Use
Agreement which shall include the information, terms and conditions included in the
regular Water Application and Agreement and also the estimated amount of water usage.
The applicant shall also pay a connection fee which shall consist of the estimated charge
for actual services rendered and non-recoverable materials used in making the
connection, plus a reasonable service charge for the processing of the Temporary Water
Use Agreement, the amount of which shall be established from time to time by the
District Manager.
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d.

Upon approval of the Water Application and Agreement, payment of the required

fees and installation of the service connections by the District, the applicant may connect
into the System through the service connection provided. The water provided shall only
be used for the purpose outlined in the Water Application and Agreement. Use in any
other manner may constitute grounds for cancellation of service.
e.

All damage to the service connection, meter and excess water usage shall be billed

to the applicant and payable upon the terms and conditions of the Water Application and
Agreement.
14.

Termination of Service:
a.

When termination of service is desired, the water user shall notify the District and

request the preparation of a final bill.
b.

If the water user is a renter or lessee, upon payment of the final bill, the District

shall refund the deposit. Otherwise, the deposit shall be applied towards the outstanding
bill. If the deposit is more than required to cover the outstanding balance for water
service, the outstanding balance shall be deducted from the deposit and the remainder
refunded to the customer. A reasonable attempt shall be made to obtain a forwarding
address to refund the remaining deposit. Deposits not refunded or claimed after one year
shall be forwarded to the state.
c.

The District shall maintain a list of customers with unpaid water bills. A Water

Application and Agreement for water service from previous customers with unpaid
balances shall not be processed until the unpaid balances, together with the interest at a
current rate as approved by the Board of Trustees, are paid.
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d.

The District may, for just cause and after due notice and an opportunity to be

heard before the District Manager or his designee, terminate the water service of any
customer.
15.

Meter Reading:
a.

To the extent possible, water meters shall be read every three months. However,

this interval may be varied under special circumstances or situations.
b.

Large water users, such as apartment complexes and some types of businesses,

shall have their meters read every month.
c.

An initial reading shall be made when water service is commenced and a final

reading shall be made when service is terminated or transferred to a new customer.
d.

For service during only a part of the billing period, the time the service is

connected shall be calculated to the nearest whole week and the minimum bi-monthly
charge shall be prorated over the number of weeks of service.
e.

Except as set forth in Subsection 3.1.2, meters may not be read from November

through March. During this time, minimum bills may be sent based on the rates and
minimum usage as set forth from time to time by the Board of Trustees. When the meters
are buried by snow or other obstacles, or in other circumstances when the meter is
inaccessible or otherwise unreadable, the District may estimate the bill, taking into
account prior years' water use, the season, and the prevailing weather patterns and water
use. Any over-charge or under-charge resulting from estimating water usage shall be
equalized when the meter is next read and a billing thereon issued.
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f.

Except when water usage is estimated, the water bill shall give a statement of the

current and past meter readings and the current water consumption.
16.

Payment of Bills:
a.

A bill shall be due and payable within 25 days from the date the statement is

prepared.
b.

A bill that is not paid by its statement due date shall be considered delinquent, at

which time a late charge of 25% of the delinquent amount shall be assessed, and shall
incur an interest charge of 1 1/2% per month (18% a.p.r.) on the delinquent balance. In
addition, legal action may be taken to collect the amount due the District.
c.

A bill which remains unpaid for more than 30 days after the statement due date

shall be sufficient grounds for termination of the water service.
d.

If a bill remains unpaid for more than 30 days after the statement due date, a

notice will be sent to the customer. The notice may or may not be contained in or printed
on a customer's bill. The notice shall state that the bill is delinquent and that unless other
arrangements are made with the District staff, the outstanding balance, late charge and
interest must be paid by the date specified in the delinquent notice (generally 15 days
after mailing); otherwise, the water service will be terminated.
e*

If, after the specified date, the bill remains unpaid, a written notice shall be hand

delivered to the service address and a 25% late notice fee shall be assessed. If no one is
home, the notice shall be placed in some conspicuous place. The notice shall state that
unless the all amounts, including accrued interest, late charge and late notice fee are paid
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or other arrangements made with the District staff within 24 hours, the water service shall
be disconnected.
f.

If the customer pays the bill, interest charge, late charge and late notice fee in full,

the account will be cleared, and revert back to normal status.
g.

If the account remains unpaid or other arrangements for payment have not been

made by the customer with the District staff, the water service shall be terminated the
morning of the second workday. Water service shall not be resumed until the delinquent
bill, interest charge, late charge and late notice fee, as well as a $50 service restoration
fee, have all been paid.
h.

If a customer calls to make payment arrangements with District staff, the reason

for the request must be unexpected financial hardships. Payment plans will only be
allowed in extreme cases. The Customer Service Section Supervisor may approve
payment plans for accounts with an outstanding balance less than $200. The Assistant
Treasurer must approve payment plans for accounts with outstanding balances in excess
of $200, but less than $500. Any plan for a balance greater than $500 must be approved
by the General Manager. The terms of the payment plan must include immediate
payment of all interest charges, late fees^ service restoration fees^ a security deposit,, if
required, and a third of the outstanding balance. The remaining balance is due in two
equal payments with the first payment due within two weeks and the second payment due
within two weeks of the first payment. In certain situations, the length of payments may
be deferred, but only with the General Manager's approval. Any scheduled payment not
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made when due will result in immediate termination of service without notice. All
outstanding amounts must be paid in foil before service is restored,
i.

If the District has terminated water service at any location for any reason, and if a

customer or owner restores service at such location through the System in any way
without remedying the cause of such termination, such customer shall be assessed three
times the normal restoration service fee, plus the cost of restoring the connection to its
normal operational status.
j.

If a customer issues any check, draft, order, or other instrument for payment of his

water bill which is not honored upon presentation to the depository institution upon
which it is drawn and is marked "refer to maker" or for any other reason not honored, a
written notice will be sent demanding payment of the bill, plus a service charge as set
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1, as it may be amended from time to time. The notice
shall also provide for payment of water received within seven (7) days from the date on
which the notice was postmarked, and the customer shall then become liable, in addition
to the amount due, for late charges and collection fees, interest, court costs, and attorney's
fees, as provided by law. Service shall be terminated the next working day without any
additional notice.
k.

Any amounts unpaid in connection with water service as provided for herein shall

become a lien upon the lot for which the water service was provided.
17.

Disputed Bills:
a.

If a customer believes that a bill is incorrect, the billing may be protested in

writing or by calling the office.
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b.

All protests shall be made within 15 days of the postmark date, or the protest is

waived.
c.

Disputed bills shall not be declared delinquent during the time the dispute is

unresolved. Upon resolution of the dispute, a new statement showing the revised charges
to the customer shall be issued. The payment of said revised charges shall become
delinquent 15 days after the statement date of the new bill. In the event that said charges
are not paid, the water service may be terminated as provided in sections 14D et. seq.
d.

In the event that a dispute remains unresolved in excess of 30 days after protest,

legal action may be initiated by the District to resolve the dispute and to collect the lawful
amounts due the District.
Rates, Charges, and Fees:
All rates, charges, and fees presently existing and hereafter established shall be set and
changed from time to time by the Board of Trustees. Rates, charges, and fees shall be
reasonably related, to the extent possible, to the cost of providing the service for which
they are assessed. A schedule of current fees and charges in effect is attached hereto as
Exhibit A.
Service Connections:
a.

To the extent practicable, each residential service connection shall supply only

one single family dwelling unit.
b.

Upon installation, the service connection becomes the property of and

responsibility of the District from the water main through the meter to the point of
connection with the pipe stubbed from the building, said point of connection being
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immediately downstream of the meter box. The meter, as part of the service connection,
shall be repaired or replaced by the District, unless it becomes damaged or inoperable due
to intentional or reckless damage by the customer. The District shall have the right to
estimate the amount of water used during the time the meter is inoperable. Such estimate
shall be based upon past usage by the customer, usage by a customer with similar
circumstances, or any other relevant criteria.
c.

Repair of leaks and service of plumbing on the customer side of the service

connection shall be the responsibility of the customer. As such, water lost through a leak
or open valve on the customer side of the service connection shall be paid for by the
customer at the prevailing rates for water. The District will attempt to notify the
customer if a leak is suspected. If a break occurs on the customer's side of the meter and
the customer petitions for relief from part of the bill, the District Manager may waive, at
his sole discretion, up to one-half of the amount attributed to the break.
d.

Where possible, the meter and service connection shall occupy the public right-of-

way. In cases where this is not possible, the meter may be situated on the customer's
property. The District shall have the right of access to water meters wherever located for
inspection and meter reading, as well as for connection service and maintenance. The
customer shall not do, or cause to be done, any act that would, in any way, impair or
prevent the District's access to the meter or service connection.
e.

The District shall periodically, or upon reasonable request of the customer, test

water meters for accuracy. Faulty meters shall be repaired or replaced by the District.
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f.

Any customer who tampers with, damages, or destroys a meter in any manner,

shall be liable to the District for all costs associated with returning the meter to its normal
operation.
g.

The District retains the right to inspect a customer's plumbing and water lines for

possible cross-connections or other conditions that may prevent a hazard to the integrity
of the System or the water conveyed by the District. If a cross-connection or other
condition is discovered that presents a hazard, water service shall be discontinued by the
District after due process, written notification of the hazard and an appropriate time lapse
for the customer's response. Service will not be resumed until the hazard is removed or
corrected.
h.

Whenever the District, acting through its inspectors, determines that a water

service connection is a hazard to the water supply, a backflow prevention device,
accepted by the Utah Department of Environmental Quality, Division of Drinking Water,
shall be installed by the customer on the service line of the customer's water system, at or
near the property line, or immediately inside the building being served; but in all cases,
before the first branch line leading off the service line. Thereafter, the customer shall
obtain a certified inspection and operational testing of the backflow prevention device at
least once per year and furnish the results to the District. In instances where the District
deems the hazard to be great, the District may require certified inspections at more
frequent intervals. The inspections and tests shall comply with standards established by
the Utah Department of Environmental Quality, Division of Drinking Water.
Multiple Units:
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a.

The owner of the property shall be liable for payment of all water delivered to the

various units.
b.

If two or more buildings are connected to the same meter, and if their ownership

should become severed, the original owner shall remain liable for payment of all water
usage until separate meters can be placed in service for each building. The new owner
shall be liable for all costs associated with the new service connection.
21.

Fire Hydrants & Fire Lines:
a.

The cost of installation and materials for fire hydrants, fire lines, and Detector

Check Systems shall be borne by those benefitting from the location of the facilities, as
determined by the District. Upon installation, the hydrants, fire lines, and Detector Check
Systems shall become the property of the District.
b.

Existing hydrants will be inspected, maintained, and replaced as determined by

the District.
c.

Use of fire hydrants without permission of the District, except by the Fire

Department, is prohibited.
d.

The District shall have the right to approve the type of fire hydrant together with

the design, specifications, and installation of all fire lines and Detector Check Systems.
A Detector Check System is required when installing a fire line.
e.

Each month the Detector Check Systems shall be inspected to insure the valves

are turned on and to check for water use. Any unauthorized use shall be billed to the
customer.
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f.

The cost of inspecting and maintaining fire lines and Detector Check Systems

shall be billed to the customer according to an approved fee schedule.
22.

Water Main Extensions:
a.

Any residential or commercial developer must request retail water service by as

set forth herein, before extensions of water mains, fire hydrants, or other waterworks.
b.

To the extent practicable, the cost of installing water line extensions shall be

borne by those benefitting from the extensions, as determined by the District.
c.

If, in the discretion of the District, projected future water needs require a water

main of greater size than that needed for the development alone, the District may require
that a larger water main be installed.

23.

d.

Existing water mains shall be maintained and replaced by the District.

e.

All water main extensions shall become the property of the District.

Upgrading Size of Connections:
Customers desiring a larger service connection than is presently in place shall be charged
the actual cost of up-sizing the connection less the fair market value of any salvaged
materials from the old connection.

24.

All Other Services:
All other services to be rendered by the District shall be negotiated between the customer
and District, and shall be approved by the Board of Trustees. Every effort shall be made
to ensure that fees charged for services rendered reasonably correspond with costs
incurred by the District for such services.

25.

General Provisions and Obligations:
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a.

The District shall not be responsible for disruptions of service caused by broken

water mains, power outages, equipment failure, or other circumstances beyond its control.
b.

In the case of any emergency such as a natural disaster, the District solicits the

cooperation of all customers. During such emergencies, the District will make every
effort to keep its customers informed of the status and adequacy of its water supply.
c.

The District reserves the right at any time, without notice, to shut off or curtail

water deliveries through its mains for the purpose of making repairs or extensions or for
other purposes, and no claim shall be made against the District, by reason of any
breakage whatsoever, or for any damage that may result from shutting off the water for
repairing, laying, or relaying mains, hydrants, or other connections, or for any other
reason whatsoever, including natural causes. The District will attempt to provide notice
to customers affected by a shut-off when adequate time exists to give such notice.
d.

In the event of scarcity of water, the Board may, by proclamation, limit the use of

water for any purpose to the extent as in its judgment is required for the public good. In
the event of such scarcity, and in the event that a meeting of the Board cannot be
convened before preventative action is required, the District's General Manager may
issue a proclamation limiting the use of water. Said proclamation shall have M l force
and effect until such time as the Board shall be able to meet.
e.

The provisions of these rules and regulations shall be severable. If any provisions

hereof, or the application of such provision under any circumstances is held invalid, it
shall not affect any other provision of these rules and regulations, or its application in a
different circumstance.
Page -17-

EXHIBIT A
1.

An initial water availability fee shall be due and payable for all lots within a subdivision

upon request by the developer for water service, in accordance with the following fee schedule:
l

A acre lot -$1,381
V2 acre lot -$2,761
1 acre lot - $5,522
2 acre lot- $11,044
Greater than 2 acre - $127 per 1,000 sq. ft.
2.

An annual standby charge shall be $ 120 per lot per year prior to connection of service,

due and payable for each lot immediately after construction of the additions to the System within
the subdivision.
3.

A connection fee shall be $400 per lot, to cover installation of a water meter and

connection to the System, due and payable upon request for connection of any lot to the System.
Thereafter, the annual standby fee shall be replaced with a minimum service fee in accordance
with the following fee schedule:
% acre lot -$180
Greater than XA acre but less than lA acre - $240
More than V2 acre but less than 1 acre - $480
Greater than 1 acre - $11 per 1,000 sq. ft.
4.

The fees set forth above may be changed from time to time by the Board of Trustees of

tiie District.
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Availability, User & Standby Fee Analysis

La Verkin Creek Irrigation System

5. Yearly User Fees
Users of the La Verkin Creek Irrigation System will pay an annual user's fee to cover
administration costs, operation and maintenance costs, and a fee that will fund total
system replacement at approximately forty-year intervals. The user fee will be based
on the amount of land developed.
Although costs have not been finalized at this time, it is anticipated that the following
costs will be included.
Item
[Administration
Operation & maintenance
1 System replacement fund

Cost/Acre/Year
$101
$241
$138
4T< j n A

1

j JLUldl

The recommended yearly user fee is $480 per acre. It is anticipated that the fee will
be collected yearly with property taxes. The WCWCD may also desire to install
irrigation water meters and impose a supplemental charge when water usage exceeds
an allotted amount. The recommended user fees are as follows3.
T,ot Size
1/4 acre
1/2 acre
1 acre
12 acres
1 Other sizes

i

Annua] User Fee
$180|
$240
$480|
$960|
$11.02/1000 sq-ftl

&
$

®

6, Standby Fees
Upon payment of water availability fees by the developer and commitment of the
WCWCD to serve a development, a yearly standby fee should be paid for each lot
without a connection. There is little cost savings, if any, in administering and
maintaining an irrigation system servings, partially completed development compared
to the cost of administering and maintaining a fully developed system. The cost of
maintaining and repairing the diversion structure, pump station, pipelines, etc. is
similar whether the system is serving fifty developed lots or seventy developed lots. If
a standby fee is not charged for lots without a connection then the development must
be subsidized either by charging the few developed lots a disproportionately high fee
or by the WCWCD. Because of this, it is recommended that a standby fee equal to or
very close to the annual user fee be charged for all lots until a connection to the
irrigation system is made.

3

The recommended user fee for lA acre lots is disproportionately higher that for larger lots because many
costs included in the user fee (including administration costs) are similar for all lots regardless of lot size.
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Availability, User & Standby Fee Analysis

1.

La Verkin Creek Irrigation System

Introduction
Historically water from La Verkin Creek was diverted into irrigation ditches and
reservoirs along the length of the creek including the ccHunter Pond" between
Toquerville and La Verkin. Land was then watered by flood irrigation from open
ditches.
The Washington County Water Conservancy District (WCWCD) created the
La Verkin Creek Irrigation System by purchasing rights to water in La Verkin Creek
and building water distribution facilities including a diversion structure, pump
station, metering and flow control station, and irrigation water lines.
Irrigation lines connecting the La Verkin Creek area to the Town of Toquerville and
the City of La Verkin were installed to allow water to be diverted from Toquerville
Springs and/or the Virgin River to the La Verkin Creek Irrigation System in the
event that insufficient water is available in La Verkin Creek. This will result in a
more reliable source of supply to those served by the system.
The Washington County Water Conservancy District has invested significant
financial resources in developing La Verkin Creek water for use in pressurized
irrigation systems. Pressurized irrigation systems will be more convenient for users
than an open ditch system, and will promote water conservation.

2- Water Rights
Water rights in the La Verkin Creek Irrigation System have been purchased by the
WCWCD when available. The WCWCD currently has approximately 1,466 acrefeet/year of water rights in the La Verkin Creek Irrigation System as summarized
below1.
WrferRigit
Source
Nucriber
81-179
MeadowHbllow
81-180
tributeks to WDowGeek
81-283
Eisha & IVfyran Sprire* Areas
81-2816
^^fflowG^eek
[81-3561
|81-3562
81-3576
81-3577
81-3578
l a \fekin Creek
81-3579
81-3589
81-3590
81-3931
81-3932

Yearly Volume
(Ac-It)
104.68
951.60
88.20
55.80
63.00
27.00
18.60
8.40
52.20
37.80
6.00
5227
1,46555

|TOIAL

&
$

<®

1

A reduction in water rights may occur in the transfer of rightsfromthe Meadow Hollow - Willow Creek area to the
Toquerville area of La Verkin Creek. If a reduction occurs, the resulting water availability fee may increase and should
be reanalyzed.
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Availability, User & Standby Fee Analysis

La Verkin Creek Irrigation System

3. System Costs
The WCWCD has constructed facilities needed to provide the most reliable service
feasible to the La Verkin Creek area. These include the La Verkin Creek diversion
and pump station, pipelines and fittings, and the metering and control station.
Because of the intermittent nature of flow in the La Verkin Creek, irrigation lines
have also been constructed to connect the La Verkin Creek area to the Toquerville
Springs and the water line supplying the Quail Creek Reservoir.
System costs are summarized in the following table.
Item
La Verkin Creek Diversion & pump station
Metering & flow control station
pipe anu -uiungs
50% of 20" pipelinefromDavis Pond to 15" line
Engineering design & inspection
Water rights
Total

Cost

1

$213,391
$14,122
*DD3,U11|

$113,950
$134,511
$316,303
$1,347,288

4* Water Availability Fees
The following table is a summarizes system costs, the potential area served, and
the recommended irrigation water availability fee.
$1,347,288

Total System Cost

244

Potential service area (acres)

$5,522

[Water availability Fee per Acre

Based upon the water availability fee calculated above, water availability fees for
selected lot sizes are given below2:
Lot Size
11/4 acre
11/2 acre
11 acre
[2 acres
1 Other sizes

Availability Fee
$1,381
$2,761
$5,522
$11,044
$127/1000 square feet

&
$

®

2

The WCWCD may desire to base the water availability fee on a cost of $ 127 per square foot of developed
property instead of attempting to place lots within a few broad categories such as V* acre, lA acre, 1 acre,
etc.
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La Verkin Creek Irrigation System

5. Yearly User Fees
Users of the La Verkin Creek Irrigation System will pay an annual user's fee to cover
administration costs, operation and maintenance costs, and a fee that will fund total
system replacement at approximately forty-year intervals. The user fee will be based
on the amount of land developed.
Although costs have not been finalized at this time, it is anticipated that the following
costs will be included.
Item
[Administration
Operation & maintenance
[ System replacement fund

Cost/Acre/Year
$101
$241
$138
M5U ]

| lUldl

The recommended yearly user fee is $480 per acre. It is anticipated that the fee will
be collected yearly with property taxes. The WCWCD may also desire to install
irrigation water meters and impose a supplemental charge when water usage exceeds
an allotted amount. The recommended user fees are as follows3.
Lot Size
1/4 acre
1/2 acre
1 acre
12 acres
1 Other sizes

Annual User Fee
$180|
$240|
$480|
$960|
$11 02/1000 sq-ft

Standby Fees
Upon payment of water availability fees by the developer and commitment of the
WCWCD to serve a development, a yearly standby fee should be paid for each lot
without a connection. There is little cost savings, if any, in administering and
maintaining an irrigation system serving a partially completed development compared
to the cost of administering and maintaining a fully developed system. The cost of
maintaining and repairing the diversion structure, pump station, pipelines, etc. is
similar whether the system is serving fifty developed lots or seventy developed lots. If
a standby fee is not charged for lots without a connection then the development must
be subsidized either by charging the few developed lots a disproportionately high fee
or by the WCWCD. Because of this, it is recommended that a standby fee equal to or
very close to the annual user fee be charged for all lots until a connection to the
irrigation system is made.

3

The recommended user fee for lA acre lots is disproportionately higher that for larger lots because many
costs included in the user fee (including administration costs) are similar for all lots regardless of lot size.
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Availability, User & Standby Fee Analysis

La Verkin Creek Irrigation System

7. Recommendations
> A Water Availability Fee for irrigation of $5,522 per developed acre should be
assessed to all developments where service has been committed before the final
plat is recorded as outlined in section four.
> Yearly user fees should be charged as outlined in section five.
> In addition to a yearly service fee, the WCWCD may also want to consider
installing irrigation water meters and imposing a supplemental charge for users
that exceed an allotted amount.
> A standby fee close to (or equal to) the annual user fee should be charged after the
water availability fee is paid and water is committed until a service connection
has been installed as discussed in section six.

&

®
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October 18, 2001.

St. George, Utah.
PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT:

Just now time to move on to the case of

Washington County Water Conservancy District and Keystone
Conversions, LLC.
(Whereupon, an off the record discussion took place.)
THE COURT:

Now, on the water conservancy district vs.

Keystone, Hjelle is here for the petitioner, Mr. Reece for the
respondent.
cases.

There, apparently, are a couple of consolidated

I have case file for number 1616.

And I don't know

what this case is about or what you are planning to do today.
MS. HJELLE:
THE COURT:
MS. HJELLE:

Your Honor?
Go ahead.
I think what we have before you today is

our petition for a ruling on the initial case which was filed,
which is the board of trustees of Washington County Water
Conservancy District vs. Keystone Conversions -- no, with
Keystone Conversions as respondent.
there.

That's why I got confused

The parties have reached a stipulation that the hearing

today would be limited to the issue of whether or not the fees
which have been imposed pursuant to a rule that is attached to
our petition.

And I do have an extra copy for the court of our

petition and the exhibits.

It is, in fact, an impact fee.

The

parties have also stipulated that the district has the power to
make and enforce all reasonable rules and regulations for the

3

management, control, delivery, use and distribution of its
water.

So Keystone has raised some additional issues both in

its answer to our petition and in its separate complaint which
was consolidated.

And I111 (inaudible) characterize it other

than I will say they focus primarily on whether or not the
actions that we took were in fact arbitrary and capricious or
illegal for some other reason.

And we have stipulated that

those issues can be reserved for later, to be addressed later
in the proceedings.

So right now before the court is solely

the issue of whether or not the fees that we have imposed meet
the statutory definition of what is an impact fee.
uair state ment i
MR. REECE:

Fair, yeah.

Your Honor, did the court -- 1

I had this hand del ivered up to 1the court yest erday morning.
You d idn t get a copy of the trial memorandum (inaudible)?
THE COURT:

Oh, it came in yesterday.

I think you can

probably make the s peech as well as I can now, Mr. Reece, on
that sort of thing.

So it's not much use to me coming in late

like that.
MR. REECE:

I think we can go through and outline the

issues before the court.
THE COURT:

Well, let me make something clear to you.

I do not have time to take another case under advisement.

If

this is can issue th at involves materials that should have been
provi.ded to me earl ier than this so that I wou Id have some idea

4

in advance what you are talking about, then this hearing will
have to be postponed.

I havenTt had the materials in advance.

And I am not in the position to be able to take on another
assignment as a case under advisement after hearing some
smattering of evidence or argument here.

I just don't have

time to do it.
MR. REECE:

There is a very --

THE COURT:

And so if it!s something that's narrow

enough that it!s just simply a matter of some evidence and
argument here and a decision, that's fine.

But if it involves

digesting all of this, no, it's not.
MS. HJELLE:

Your Honor, we would certainly submit

that it is narrow enough.

It is simply a question of looking

at the definition of the statute, looking at the black and
white language of our regulation and saying, how do they
interrelate with one another?

Does our regulation meet or not

meet the definition of the statute?

We would submit that any

other arguments and issues raised in the trial memorandum are
simply irrelevant to that question.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. REECE:

My response to that, these are very

complicated issues.
memorandum.

That's why we gave the court the trial

I apologize they got to the court yesterday

morning as opposed to maybe two days prior to the hearing.

But

the issues are very complicated, as Mrs. -- or Ms. Hjelle

5

suggests.

ItTs a matter of looking at the regulations, seeing

what's happened there.

And the exhibits are in connection with

their minutes and their hearing both on June 12
July 17

' and applying that to the statute.

take -- that!s -- it!s complicated.

and on

Now, that would

It!s not a matter

(inaudible) arguments are, that's the end of it.
THE COURT:
Reece.

(Inaudible.)

I guess you know my next question, Mr.

What did you think I was going to do with this bound

volume when you submitted it yesterday and it was delivered to
me yesterday afternoon?
MR. REECE:

I hoped that you would have a chance to

read jLt and (inaudible) .

is this.

THE COURT:

When?

MR. REECE:

Yesterday afternoon.

THE COURT:

Let's be realistic, Mr. Reece.

MR. REECE:

The point I'm trying to make to the court

We are not going to be able to resolve this.

These

issues here, filed by the petitioner, were filed for a general
hearing on this date.

They published notice in the paper.

They published in three public places, I guess.

(Inaudible)

but required by the statute published this notice.

Court can

take record or note for the record there was no one here except
for my clients.

And so, as far as between us, we would prefer

to continue the matter until the court has time to review the
trial memorandum until the court has time to be more prepared

6

to go through and see what we have here.
this is too complicated for the court.
undoubtedly will be up on appeal.

My point simply is,
Itfs an issue that

It's something the court

ought to spend some time reviewing.

Having not even read the

petition for this morning, Your Honor, the court, I think,
would be (inaudible) to spend the extra time, read through our
common memorandum and (inaudible).
THE COURT:

Mr. Reece, notice of this hearing was

given two months ago.
MR. REECE:

That's correct.

THE COURT:

And you filed an appearance more than a

month ago.

Why is it that you are only filing your trial

memorandum fewer than 24 hours before the hearing?
MR. REECE:

Ifm -- my schedule, Your Honor, and I'm

lucky I got it to the court (inaudible) even before the
hearing.
THE COURT:
this hearing.

Well, I'm not going to consider it for

It's unrealistic.

requirements of the rules.

And it doesn't meet the

And if that results in what you

think is a poor decision and you end up going on appeal and
spending your client's money for appeal instead of getting
things into the court here on time, I guess that's one way to
approach it.
MR. REECE:

So the court's (inaudible) review on

request?

7

THE COURT:

I don ! t even know what the matter is other

than a little bit that I have heard here.
Now, Miss Hjelle, you say that these are things that
are raised by your petition, but what is this process that you
are undertaking by this notice of petition and hearing?
MS. HJELLE:

Your Honor, under the water conservancy

act, which begins at 17 (a)-2-1401, there is a provision by
which I would refer the court to 17 (a)-2-1442.
be a highlighted version.
an extra copy.

This happens to

And I have to admit, I didn't make

It's just highlighted some of the language.

But perhaps that would clarify things for the court.
Essentially, we are empowered to bring a petition for what I
would call the equivalent of declaratory judgment and an action
taken by our board.

Well, until we get to the second to the

last sentence of this section, it looks like another of the
legislature's attempts to create some kind of process in the
court without reference to any of the rules of the court.

Then

it says, "The Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern and matters
of pleading and practice where not otherwise specified herein."
So from this statute you are taking it that a petition itself
can be considered just upon a notice of hearing, the notice of
hearing being specified in the statute or at least the notice
of filing specified.

And there's sort of a backhanded

reference to a notice of hearing on the petition, in the way
this is phrased.

And then, what is the court supposed to do?

8

Is this a trial?

Is it a motion hearing?

What is it?

You are

asking me to guess what the legislature was thinking, if they
were thinking at all, when they passed this sort of thing?
MS. HJELLE:

I guess -- maybe I'm oversimplifying it.

But I think if you would allow me to begin my argument and
begin it, see how far I get with it.
THE COURT:
we are in.
petition?

To me itfs --

I!m still wondering about what procedure

Am I being asked to grant a motion or to grant a
What do you think the procedure is that we are

following?
MS. HJELLE:

Yes, you are being asked to grant a

petition.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. HJELLE:
minute?

May I refer with my client for just one

He seems to desire to say something.
MR. THOMPSON:

Do you mind if I add to the court and

make this a little more informal?
THE COURT:

Do you mind?

MR. REECE:

I donft mind, Your Honor.

MR. THOMPSON:

The reason this was in the water

conservancy statute is the district's not just ours, but around
the state we are dealing with financing and water contracts and
rules that had brought public interest.

They had to know that

they, in fact, were going to be legal and enforceable, because
they were borrowing large amounts of money.

They were building
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significant infrastructure.

And so the purpose of this section

was to provide a way that when the board took an action, they
could go ask where it was important, ask the court for
declaratory judgment that what they had done was either legal
or illegal, so that they didn't move forward in an arena on
shaky legal grounds.

And I think what the legislature, at

least my understanding this has always been, that their
intent -- and we have used this on a couple of other occasions,
particularly in some financing -- what the court -- what the
legislature was concerned about is that as you are building in
this infrastructure, and the courts have been (inaudible) the
water system, that there would be a way that people depending
on it knew that the action was final, it was legal and
non-appealable so you had some certainty that that action
wasn't just a whim of an appointed body, but you had kind of a
second look at that, a fairly quick look at it, so that as you
move forward making those policies or entering the contracts
that you knew they were going to be valid and enforceable.
That was the purpose of the statute and the reason that that
was in there.

And you see it used in districts, particularly

seeing it used extensively in the Central Utah Project and
other places.

And we have used it on occasion rarely.

THE COURT:

You mentioned something like a declaratory

judgment process.
MR. THOMPSON:

Well, it really is a declaratory
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judgment.

This is what it is.

Now, whether we -- you know, we

think we followed the statute correctly.
of the background what's passed.

That was the intent

And thatfs how it's being

used in (inaudible) around the state.
THE COURT:
MS. HJELLE:
other points.

Okay.

Thank you.

Your Honor, if I may make a couple of

And I may not have the citation with me.

But

there is a section of this statute that is sequential to 1442.
I thought I had made copies, but I am having a hard time
finding it.

Oh, wait.

1444.

(Inaudible) 1444.

"All cases in

which there may arise a validity -- a question of validity," et
cetera, et cetera -- I!ll skip all this kind of thing.

Let's

say, "the question shall be advanced as a matter of immediate
public interest and concern and heard at the earliest practical
moment.

The court shall be open at all times for purposes of

this part."

Secondly, I would like to submit --

MR. THOMPSON:
THE COURT:

Separation of branches.

I'm not sure that's a concept that exists.

At least not in the constitution of Utah.
MS. HJELLE:

It's certainly my understanding under a

stipulation -- and this is my copy of the stipulation that I
signed and returned to opposing counsel.
opposing counsel's signature.
MR. REECE:

It doesn't have

But I assume there is one.

There is one.

In fact, Your Honor, I've

got a -- it should have been (inaudible) by this court.
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THE COURT:

I think I saw this m

the file.

MR. REECE:

(Inaudible) signed copy of the order

yeste rday.
THE COURT:

Oh, that!s where it was.

Ifm not sure where it is.

yesterday with the order.
have seen it.

I received it
But I

Thank you.

MS. HJELLE:

It was certainly my understanding that we

had a stipulation that the portion of the hearing on whether or
not this is an impact fee could go forward today.

And,

frankly, I!m a little bit unprepared to even hear that there
was an objection to having a hearing.

I think that -- of

course, counsel has the trial memorandum.
reason for it.

And maybe that's the

But --

THE COURT:

Well, it says the court shall be open at

all times.
MS. HJELLE:

(Inaudible.)

I don f t know if that!s good

to submit to you or not.
MR. REECE:

(Inaudible), Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay.

So you planned then to present oral

argument or any evidence also?

Or is it really the evidence

not in dispute, it's a question of interpretation?
MS. HJELLE:

I don't think the evidence is in dispute.

I think probably -- obviously, I have Mr. Thompson here if
there was some clarity.

If we got to that point, I suppose

that could be something that can be ruled on at the time.

But
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my anticipation will be that we would make our arguments and
the court would rule on what it could rule on today, and you
would make that decision.
can't.

I mean, if it can't be done, it

I still have hope of persuading you that these issues

are not that complex, that they are pretty straight forward,
that you can make that simple narrow question ruling on that
simple narrow question today, and that the rest of the issues
raised -- counsel has the opportunity to bring those up to you
in oral argument.

(Inaudible) convince you that they are

significant enough or add some complexity that I don't think is
there, then, perhaps, we may need to have a continuance.

But I

think this could be ruled on today based on the material facts
that are before you in the petition and the exhibits.
THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

Let's go ahead with

your presentation then.
MS. HJELLE:
appreciate that.
petition.

All right.

Thank you, Your Honor.

I

I won't belabor the point that we filed a

The attachment to the petition, Your Honor, is the

final rules and regulations of the secondary retail water
service for the LaVerkin Creek area.
engineer's study.

In addition, there is an

And I think I already handed you that, the

copy we brought with us today for you on that.

At any rate, as

I indicated earlier, we think it's a very simple question of
looking at the salient, the relevant language.
regulation.

It's a long

But I think we can focus in on the material parts

ia

THE COURT:
courts now.

Yeah.

I!m acting like the appellate

It won't come out on a transcript as entirely

facetious, but that's okay.

But, really, when I read appellate

opinions and I read a section called background, I wonder what
the actual facts were.

They always use the term "background."

And I don't know where any of those facts came from.
kind of fell from the sky, I guess.

It just

And when the district

courts go to such great pains to try to determine what the
facts are, then the appellate court says here's some
background.
situation.

I don't know what that means.

That's a personal

But I am asking along those lines, what's the

general background of what's going on here?
MS. HJELLE:

And the general background, obviously,

the parties are going to disagree as to the history of this and
why.

But, you know, our position is Toquerville is a

municipality functioning within its municipal role.

TSWS is a

means by which Toquerville may provide secondary water within
Toquerville.

It is our understanding that Toquerville requires

a developer to install the pipes, the infrastructure as a
condition of development.

We don't.

And but it is also our

understanding that Toquerville does not require them to
connect.

And it is our understanding that, for some reason or

other, Toquerville -- Keystone doesn't want to get their water
from Toquerville.
Now, our regulation says before they could even, we
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would go to all these other steps of charging them a fee and
agreeing to provide them water and so forth, first thing we
need from them is something in writing saying Toquerville will
not provide them a service.
that.

We aren't there.

We don't have

So as far as I guess I can say, you know, we have our

views on this, but we don't think that this regulation at this
point even applies to them.
Now, they raise the issue of standing and so forth.
That says they have no standing to be here.

We didn't dispute

their standing to be here on the issue of, narrow issue of
looking at our regulation and looking at the statute, is it an
impact fee?

But we would dispute, Your Honor, their ability to

come into this court today and start arguing all of these
extraneous facts about whether they can get water from
Toquerville or not when our regulation says before you can even
get water from us, we have to have something from Toquerville
saying they refuse to give you water.
and white question.

So, to us, it's a black

The issues that they are entitled to raise

before the court today are the issues of giving these
definitions given the black and white statement of our
regulation, which we are entitled to have reviewed on its face
and on the district record.

And that's what's in the file the

court has, not these extraneous documents in their trial brief
and this contract with C. F. H. that was submitted today.
These are just not relevant facts because they haven't come to
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us with a letter from Toquerville saying we can't get water.
We won't give you water.
THE COURT:
my office.

Okay.

I'll stop there.

Thank you.

Well, thank you.

I'll take it to

I'll put it at the bottom of this stack.

get to it as quickly as I can.

And I'll

That's probably the best I can

tell you.
MR. REECE:

Thank you very much.
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